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A Critical Analysis of Health and Human
Services' Proposed Health Privacy Regulations
in Light of The Health Insurance Privacy and
Accountability Act of 1996
A. Craig Eddy*
INTRODUCTION
Historically, Americans have zealously protected their privacy
and personal information.1 The more intimate the information,
the greater the level of concern. The reason Americans cherish
privacy so dearly is perhaps rooted in their devotion to personal
freedom and individual identity. Authors Ellen Alderman and
Caroline Kennedy capture this feeling in their book The Right to
Privacy by writing:
Privacy covers many things. It protects the solitude necessary
for creative thought. It allows us the independence that is part
of raising a family. It protects our right to be secure in our
own homes and possessions, assured that the government can-
not come barging in. Privacy also encompasses our right to
self determination and to define who we are. Although we
live in a world of noisy self-confession, privacy allows us to
keep certain facts to ourselves if we so choose. The right to
privacy, it seems, is what makes us civilized.2
Facts regarding physical and emotional wellbeing in the form
of a medical record are perhaps the most intimate and personal
* Associate Professor of Cardiovascular Disease, Department of Pharmaceutical
Sciences, and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Montana; Vice President, St.
Patrick Hospital, Missoula, Montana; Of Counsel to the firm of Garlington, Lohn and
Robinson, Missoula, Montana; A.B., Oberlin College, 1974; M.D., University of Cin-
cinnati, 1978; J.D. University of Montana, 1999; LL.M. 2000 Loyola University of
Chicago. The author would like to thank Professors John Blum, Joan Krause, Ida
Androwich and Larry Singer for suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper; Dr. Mar-
garet Eddy for editorial assistance and other support; Professors Charles Rice and
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1. See DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER & JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT 9 (1992) (giving several examples of how Americans have been much more
concerned with privacy than their European ancestors).
2. ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY xiii
(1995).
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of all information. A medical record consists of information di-
vulged by a uniquely vulnerable human being, worried in some
manner about the core of her very existence, to a trusted person
with superior knowledge. This data is recorded after being
filtered through the critical lens of a physician or other caregiver
ostensibly encumbered by no interest beyond the patient's
health and well-being.
Patients always have been concerned that information en-
trusted to their physicians is not revealed to others and possibly
used against them. Anglo-American courts recognize the need
to balance the societal interest in encouraging patients to be
completely open and truthful with their physicians against the
need for society to access certain health information. This has
taken the form of a formal judicial policy of a patient/physician
privilege which parallels the sanctity of the nearly two thousand
year old penitent/confessor privilege.3
The origin and development of extensive recorded medical in-
formation is actually quite new. Until recently, medical records
were minimalist notes jotted quickly by a physician to remember
a few details of a patient's condition that he feared he might
forget along with perhaps some billing information. Most of the
details, especially the intimate ones, resided primarily in the
head of the physician. In the period after World War I, physi-
cian specialization proliferated and was attended by an increase
in the practice of patient referral. This basic concept was ex-
panded during World War II where wartime medicine evolved
from definitive treatment on the front lines, to initial battlefield
first aid, followed by transport and ultimate treatment at be-
hind-the-lines field hospitals. In this model of patient care, it
became imperative for physicians to not only remind themselves
about care delivered and treatments instituted but also to com-
3. See Seymour Moskowitz & Michael J. DeBoer, When Silence Resounds: Clergy
and the Requirement To Report Elder Abuse and Neglect, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 1
(1999). "The clergy-penitent testimonial privilege has its roots in ancient English
common law, and its antecedents may be found in Roman Catholic doctrine that con-
sidered the Seal of Confession inviolate. The privilege was first recognized in the
United States by a New York court in 1813 which held that a Catholic Priest could not
be compelled to reveal what he heard during confession. The court found that forcing
a priest to violate the secrecy of the confessional violated the priest's constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion. As early as 1875, in dictum, the Supreme Court
stated: 'On this principle, suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure
of the confidence of the confessional: .... ' Today, all American states and the federal
courts recognize a clergy-penitent privilege, although its scope varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction." Id. at 55-56.
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municate that treatment to other subsequent caregivers. Finally,
with the explosion in medical technology over the past twenty
years there has been a concomitant increase in specialization
and, in some cases, delegation of medical treatments to non-pro-
fessional technicians. These advances in medical care spawned a
corresponding increase in the amount of information formally
recorded so it can be accurately and efficiently communicated to
multiple users over longer distances. Thus, as the norm of medi-
cal care has evolved from delivery by a single physician in a sin-
gle location, to care rendered by a multidisciplinary team often
located on diverse campuses and even in different states, the
meticulously detailed, problem-oriented medical record4 has be-
come an indispensable tool to coordinate, document and
streamline care.
Traditionally, physicians have been stalwart guardians of the
personal medical information revealed to them. That duty has
been explicit and implicit for more than two thousand years, em-
blazoned in both the Hippocratic Oath5 and the Code of Mai-
monides,6 two of the oldest statements of physician commitment
to patient privacy. These statements are still recited at medical
student graduations and hang in physician offices throughout
the country as a reminder of that duty.
Physicians originally fulfilled their duty to guard patient pri-
vacy by insisting that patient medical records were a physician's
4. The universally accepted protocol for individual encounters described in medi-
cal records divides the narrative into four parts, using the acronym SOAP (Subjective,
Objective, Assessment, Plan), which was introduced to medicine in the late 1960s
along with the concept of the problem-oriented medical record. Subjective means
what the patient says about herself or her condition, while objective means what phy-
sicians and other providers find on examination. Assessment is the physician's subjec-
tive medical judgment about what is transpiring with the patient; plan outlines the
proposed course of action and intervention. See generally William J. Donnelly &
Daniel J. Brauner, Comment, Why SOAP is Bad for the Medical Record, 152 ARCH.
INTERNAL MED. 481 (1992); see also John D. Stoeckle & J. Andrew Billings, A His-
tory of History-taking: The Medical Interview, 2 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 119 (1987).
5. "Whatever, in connection with my professional practice or not in connection
with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will
not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret." Hippocratic Oath, circa
400 BCE, reprinted in HIPPOCRATES, WORKS 299-301 (trans., Loeb).
6. "Inspire me with love for my art and for Thy creatures. Do not allow thirst for
profit, ambition for renown and admiration, to interfere[through misuse of medical
information] with my profession, for these are the enemies of truth and of love for
mankind and they can lead astray in the great task of attending to the welfare of Thy
creatures." Attributed to Moses Maimonides, a twelfth-century Jewish physician in
Egypt, but possibly written by Marcus Herz, a German physician, pupil of Immanual
Kant, and physician to Moses Mendelssohn. First appeared in print in 1793.
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work product and, thus, actually a physician's property. With
this view, they adamantly refused to let patients themselves ex-
amine those records except under extenuating circumstances.
As medical paternalism declined after World War II, patients
were given the right to access their own information. However,
perhaps even as an unintended consequence, the derivative right
of the patient to assign access to his medical records to third
parties-such as relatives, attorneys and insurance companies-
accompanied the right of personal access to medical records.
Unfortunately, patients are proving less successful at protect-
ing their own medical information than their physicians once
were. Third party payers, managed care providers and the gov-
ernment increasingly are interested in the personal medical in-
formation of patients for whom they underwrite medical
expenses. These parties argue that they have a legitimate busi-
ness need for such information and then insert that claim into
the language of a contract with the patient. Additionally, em-
ployers, life insurance companies and marketing interests are at-
tempting to claim an expanded interest in individual patient
information. This claim is more tenuous, but colorable, if its
root is in information legally purchased from another legitimate
owner or information resident on shared informatics systems.
These third party claims to information generated in the phy-
sician patient relationship have resulted in patients losing con-
trol over their individual medical information once it enters the
stream of commerce. Anecdotal reports of abuses of personal
information, coupled with America's privacy fixation and a
growing distrust of the government and large corporations, have
stimulated the American public to demand better control over
their personal information.
After an extended public outcry voicing the concern that
there was less protection for the privacy of medical information
than existed for the protection of financial information, Con-
gress, as an afterthought to the main body of the Health Im-
provement and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), added
section 264 entitled "Recommendations with Respect to Privacy
of Certain Health Information."' 7 Section 264 of HIPAA, in
turn, required Congress or the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to safeguard the privacy interests that
individual patients were having difficulty protecting.
7. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
[Vol. 9
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This article has several purposes. Its primary purpose is to
inquire, through a detailed analysis of all relevant statutory pro-
visions, whether it is likely that the HIPAA legislation or the
regulations promulgated thereunder (the "Standards for Privacy
of Individually Identifiable Health Information Regulations"
(SPIIHI)) will efficiently and cost-effectively defend the privacy
issues they were intended to safeguard. Neither the premise
that medical information should be considered private nor the
premise that it deserves some level of protection is disputed.
Rather, this article critically analyzes HHS' broad and expensive
proposal to determine whether it is an efficient use of health
care dollars. Indeed, compliance with the law is projected to
cost health care providers billions of dollars.
To accomplish this critical analysis, an understanding of ex-
actly what aspect of privacy HHS intends to protect and a
knowledge of the pervasiveness of the threat to that privacy is
necessary. To that end, Part I addresses the concept of privacy
in general and, more specifically, medical privacy in our current
society. It points out the first major flaw in SPIIHI: the fact
that HHS failed to adequately and coherently define its ultimate
goal. The article then attempts to define more clearly what as-
pect of privacy HIPAA and SPIIHI should protect. Part II fo-
cuses on the extent of the invasion of medical record privacy
that exists currently and may exist in the future highlighting SPI-
IHI's second major flaw: its proposed protections are not fo-
cused on the existing problem.
Parts III and IV examine the privacy section of HIPAA (§264)
and HHS's proposed rule (SPIIHI) in detail. Part IV examines
how and why Congress acted legislatively to protect the privacy
of medical records. Part IV explains how the Department of
Health and Human Services has exceeded the legislative man-
dates of Congress with its six hundred page proposed rule. It
briefly discusses all aspects of SPIIHI but focuses on two pri-
mary areas: the actual provisions and the regulatory impact
analysis. Of particular importance is the comparison of HHS'
cost analysis to that of private industry.
Part V analyzes whether HHS' efforts are constitutional, cost
efficient, or effective, and concludes that they are not. It also
examines the rationale for other major burdens imposed on the
health care system by SPIIHI (administrative, preemptive, re-
search related and enforcement related) concluding that these
burdens cost more than the value of the protection they offer.
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Finally, Part VI proposes three potential courses of action for
HHS to salvage its work in SPIIHI, and constitutionally and
more cost effectively accomplish its purpose to protect IIHI.
I. THE CONCEPT OF PROTECTABLE PRIVACY: AN
HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVE
A. The Concept of Privacy in General
The notion of a right to privacy is ancient and pervasive. It is
alluded to in the Bible and expressed in the Aristotelian concept
of a dichotomy between the public and private realms.8 In more
recent history, John Locke applied this concept to distinguish
between private property and property owned publicly or in
common with all.9 Anthropologic studies by Margaret Mead
and others suggest that the concept of privacy is cross-cultural
and present in all but the simplest, most primitive societies. 10
Americans can never be sure what their founding fathers in-
tended regarding federal protection of a right to privacy. A
"right to privacy" is not explicitly mentioned in the United
States Constitution or the Bill of Rights. In fact, the word pri-
vacy never appears in these documents at all, arguably sug-
gesting that the founding fathers thought the states were capable
of protecting citizens' privacy rights as a part of their general
welfare. Despite this lack of clarity, both state and federal
courts, as well as legislatures, have demonstrated a willingness
to protect some forms of personal privacy.1 The concept of a
fundamental right to privacy is bifurcated into two distinct
rights: one right is based in natural law,'2 the Judeo-Christian
law, Aristotle and Locke's philosophy of law and British com-
8. See JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS AND THE
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 9-25 (1997). Ms. DeCew quotes Milton Konvitz pointing out
that the Adam and Eve story introduces the feeling of shame at the violation of pri-
vacy and emphasizes how Aristotle divided an individual's life into two realms: the
polis (the realm common to all citizens) and the oikos (the realm of the private house-
hold).
9. See id. (citing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 4
(Thomas P. Peardon ed. 1988)).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature. It is recog-
nized intuitively, consciousness being the witness that can be called to establish its
existence. Any person whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once that
as to each individual member of society there are matters private, and there are mat-
ters public so far as the individual is concerned. See Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905).
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mon law; a second right is implied from the language of the
United States Constitution.13
B. The Common Law Right to Privacy
The common law right of privacy has been crafted by and en-
forced through the law of tort, initially using the tort of bat-
tery.14 In 1880, Judge Thomas Cooley included in his treatise on
torts a "right to be let alone," which he explained as a "right" to
one's person or personal immunity.15 Soon after, in a medical
setting, the term privacy was invoked in a battery tort advanced
by a woman who was observed during childbirth without her
consent.'6 In this case, the Michigan Supreme Court held: "the
plaintiff had a legal right to the privacy of her apartment at such
a time, and the law secures to her this right by requiring others
to observe it, and to abstain from its violation. 17
In 1890, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren eloquently devel-
oped Cooley's tort concept in their Harvard Law Review Arti-
cle, entitled The Right to Privacy.8 This article has been called
the most famous and influential law review article ever written,
prompting Roscoe Pound to remark that it " 'did nothing less
than add a chapter to our law.' "19 Brandeis' and Warren's arti-
cle stated that "political, social and economic changes entail the
recognition of new rights ' 20 and they proposed, in reaction to a
perception that the press was overstepping the bounds of de-
cency, two new rights: the right to be let alone and the right to
be protected from the unauthorized publicity of essentially pri-
vate affairs. 21 They urged the common law to vindicate and pro-
tect those rights.2 2 They further observed that the common law
already offered some protection against the mental distress as-
sociated with public publishing of private information (e.g. the
protection against making private letters available to the pub-
13. See DECEW, supra note 8.
14. See DECEW, supra note 8, at 17.
15. THOMAS C. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS (1880).
16. See De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160 (1881).
17. See id. at 165-166 (emphasis added).
18. See Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
19. Nicholas D. Bieter, Minnesota's Right of Privacy Torts: Expanding Common
Law Beyond Its Reasonable Constitutional Bounds in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 177, 181 (1998).
20. Brandeis & Warren, supra note 18.
21. Brandeis & Warren, supra note 18, at 215.
22. See id. at 195-215.
2000]
7
Eddy: A Critical Analysis of Health and Human Services' Proposed Health
Published by LAW eCommons, 2000
Annals of Health Law
lic).2 3 They argued this protection should be extended to protect
privacy more generally saying:
"The principle which protects personal writings and any other
productions of the intellect or of the emotions is the right to
privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it
extends this protection to the personal appearance, sayings,
acts, and to personal relations, domestic or otherwise. ' '24
They reinforced their argument by reviewing various court deci-
sions that protected privacy and concluded that an individual
had a type of ownership interest in the facts of his private life.25
Brandeis and Warren conceded their proposed common law
right to privacy was not absolute.26 For example, matters of gen-
eral public interest or pertaining to public figures could be in-
vestigated and published without legal recourse.27 Further, they
stipulated that consent should be a defense to invasion of
privacy.28
Between 1890 and the present, the tort of invasion of privacy
has been recognized in some form, via statutory or common law,
by all fifty states.2 9 With some state to state variation, it is usu-
ally subdivided into four major groups: (1) appropriation of an
individual's name or image for the commercial advantage of an-
other; (2) publication of facts placing an individual in a false
light; (3) intrusion upon an individual's affairs or seclusion; and
(4) public disclosure of private facts about an individual. 30 The
first two groups, commercial advantage and false light, have lit-
tle to do with the type of privacy at issue in medical information
and will not be included in this discussion. However, intrusion
into an individual's affairs or seclusion and public disclosure of
private facts are the type of privacy invasion that occurs when
medical records are made public. Further, this is the type of
privacy that states have been willing to protect under their re-
served power to guard the welfare of their populations. How-
ever, in the universe of common law privacy rights, a real
23. See id. at 213.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 195-200.
26. See Brandeis & Warren, supra note 18, at 213-20.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60008. However, four states limit the right of privacy to commercial use
violations. See JOHN WADE ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 948 (1994).
30. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960) (later incorpo-
rated into the Second Restatement of Torts).
[Vol. 9
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question remains about whether or not the Federal government
should intrude upon this state power.
C. The Constitutional Right to Privacy
The second type of privacy right is Constitutional in nature.
Constitutional privacy exists at both the state and federal levels.
Thus, state and federal protections overlap, with some states af-
fording more privacy protection than the federal government.
1. Federal Privacy Protections
The federal constitutional right to privacy also can be traced
back to Louis Brandeis, who, in his role as a Supreme Court
Justice, advocated a broad interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment to insure that the government refrained from intruding
into the privacy of the individual. He stated in his dissent in
Olmstead v. United States:31
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of
his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred,
as against the government, the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.32
Between 1928 and 1965, Brandeis' position in the Olmstead dis-
sent gradually gained favor with the Court and in the1965 Gris-
wold v. Connecticut33 opinion, Justice William 0. Douglas found
a penumbral right to privacy emanating from the Constitution
and its First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments. This concept
quickly became accepted and, after Olmstead was overturned by
Katz v. United States34 in 1967, the right to privacy was cited in a
variety of cases over the next few years. However, the citation
was always in the context of a right of privacy against govern-
31. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
32. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2000]
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mental intrusion, not against the intrusion of an individual or a
private corporation into the affairs of a patient.35
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized a
right of individuals to be free from governmental intrusion into
their private lives, it has not yet held that this right to privacy
limits governmental power to collect data about private individ-
uals.36 In Whalen v. Roe,37 the Supreme Court examined this
question in detail and held in the majority opinion that "state
legislation which has some effect on... privacy" is not unconsti-
tutional "simply because a court finds that effect unnecessary, in
whole or in part. ' 38 However, Justice Stevens noted in dicta that
government data collection could threaten individual privacy,
and that the right to collect that data could be limited by a duty
to avoid unwarranted disclosure.39 In the end, the Court in
Whalen specifically refused to decide whether it would uphold a
statute without these safeguards saying: "we ... need not, and
do not, decide any question which might be presented by... a
system that did not contain comparable security provisions. ''40
2. State Privacy Protections
Most states follow the federal lead in deriving a right to pri-
vacy from the penumbras of their constitutions. However, ten
state constitutions confer to their citizens an explicit right of pri-
vacy.41 Some states, such as California, have added this provi-
sion by constitutional amendment.42 Others, such as Montana,
have included the right in the ratified document.4 3
For the most part, state constitutional provisions only protect
against governmental intrusion into an individual's privacy.
35. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a Virginia statute
forbidding interracial marriage based on a right to privacy); see also Stanley v Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (allowing the possession of obscene material in the privacy of
an individual's home) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (citing the right of
privacy as a reason to permit distribution of contraceptive devices).
36. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 14.26-14.30 (5th ed. 1995).
37. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
38. Id. at 597.
39. See id. at 605.
40. See id. at 605-06.
41. See DARIEN A. McWIRTER & JON D. BIBLE, PRIVACY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT 174, 179 n.5 (1992) (Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Lou-
isiana, Montana, South Carolina and Washington).
42. J. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV.
327, 328 (1992).
43. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
[Vol. 9
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Some states however, such as Montana, indicate a willingness to
extend this protection to non-government actions.44 Montana's
explicit right to privacy says, "[t]he right of individual privacy is
essential to the well being of a free society . . . .45
D. How Much and What Kind of Privacy Does
SPIIHI Intend To Protect?
In light of the historical context surrounding the right of pri-
vacy, the question arises as to the type and scope of privacy pro-
tection HHS is seeking to afford. It is unlikely that HHS is
referring to commercial advantage and false light privacy pro-
tection because these types of privacy protection have little to
do with medical records. Therefore the privacy rights HHS is
likely referring to are intrusion into an individual's seclusion and
public disclosure privacy rights. In support of this supposition,
the SPIIHI section entitled "Need for the Proposed Action"
quotes liberally from the case of Whalen v. Roe46 making it clear
that SPIIHI intends to address only one of many aspects of the
privacy right:
The [Whalen] Court, in upholding the statute, recognized at
least two different kinds of interests within the constitutionally
protected zone of privacy. "One is the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters," such as this proposed
regulation principally addresses. This interest in avoiding dis-
closure, discussed in Whalen in the context of medical infor-
mation, was found to be distinct from a different line of cases
concerning "the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions."47
Another issue surrounding HHS' intentions is whether it is
referring to common law or constitutional privacy. Although
HHS mixes the discussion of these two rights, again, considering
the underlying purpose of the regulation, it seems most likely
HHS is focusing on the common law type protections because
Constitutional privacy protections are too narrow to accomplish
its stated goals. However, by invoking the term "fundamental
right" and using Whalen-a governmental intrusion case-to jus-
tify SPIIHI's burdens, HHS muddies the water. It seems to pri-
marily base its argument for common law privacy protection on
44. See Mont. Const. Conven. Transcripts 632 (1972).
45. MONT. CONST. Art. II, § 10 (emphasis added).
46. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
47. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 60008.
2000]
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the Federal Constitutional right to privacy in the accumulation
and distribution of IIHI.48 This position is untenable in that it
would only support expenses for prevention of government in-
vasion of individual privacy, a protection that SPIIHI does not
even provide except in the narrow circumstance when a state or
federal government is functioning as a covered entity.49
II. THE EXISTING PROBLEM OF MEDICAL RECORD PRIVACY
From the very beginning, HHS' approach raises serious ques-
tions as to clarity of its ultimate purpose and the chosen path to
achieve it. To be effective, it is critical to make informed triage
decisions about what information is most important to safeguard
and from whom and in what context it must be protected. Un-
fortunately, SPIIHI fails to adequately address these
considerations.
A. The Increasing Potential for Misusing Health Information
The United States healthcare industry is made up of in excess
of twelve million providers, suppliers, researchers and payers, in
more than 500,000 companies,50 delivering care through an esti-
mated 2 billion patient encounters per year.51 The unrestricted
rapid flow of medical information is essential to maintaining the
best health care system in the world, especially ministering to a
mobile population with high expectations.
As technologic sophistication in the gathering, storage, trans-
mission and disclosure of data have advanced over the past
three decades, there is little doubt that individual privacy is in-
creasingly jeopardized. The zone of privacy expectation has
been gradually, but consistently eroded. If an individual re-
leases data about himself, legal precedent holds that he cannot
reasonably expect it will remain private. At the same time, how-
48. See id. at 60008-10.
49. See infra Part IV for a more detailed discussion of covered entities and when
HIPAA and SPIIHI apply to governmental actions.
50. Robert E. Nolan Company, Inc., Cost and Impact Analysis: Common Compo-
nents of Confidentiality Legislation 2 (Fall 1999), <http://www.renolan.com/healthcare/
privacy.htm>.
51. See id. at Exhibit B. This exhibit uses data publicly available from the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control, National Health
Interview Survey, American Hospital Association, Health Insurance Association of
America, National Center for Health Statistics, National Home and Hospice Care
Survey and others to estimate the number of patient encounters per year.
[Vol. 9
12
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol9/iss1/3
Proposed Federal Health Privacy Regulations
ever, most modern day interactions require some degree of
disclosure.
Data collection in and of itself, however, is not the threat. To
threaten privacy, data must be converted to useful information
that can be further transformed into knowledge compelling ac-
tion. Scientists and researchers realized long ago that mere
large amounts of raw data are relatively inadequate without an
algorithm for analysis. The discipline of packaging raw con-
sumer data in such a way it becomes useful information is the
science of informatics. The needs and motives of the end user
define what is useful. Thus in informatics, data must be pack-
aged differently for a business user than for a consumer, a hospi-
tal or a government.
Thus, while there has always been a potential for misuse of
IIHI that possibility is clearly embellished by electronic storage
and transmission of such data. However, as in most personal
issues, it is impractical for the federal government to prevent all
potential harms. Instead it should focus on harms that actually
exist or are very likely to occur.
B. What Harms Have Actually Occurred?
The question as to what harms actually occurred is a difficult
question to answer. HHS and most legislators have chosen to
address the question by quoting surveys and describing anec-
dotes rather than objectively analyzing damages that can be doc-
umented. Legislative anecdotes abound and include horrifying
cases such as a health worker sending the names of four thou-
sand HIV positive patients to a Florida newspaper and a Na-
tional Enquirer article about singer Tammy Wynette's supposed
liver disease based on purloined medical information. 2 Surveys
are also plentiful. SPIIHI's introductory section uses non-scien-
tific survey results on the need for privacy standards to justify its
scope stating:
Indeed, a Wall Street Journal/ABC poll on September 16,
1999, asked Americans what concerned them most in the com-
ing century. "Loss of personal privacy" was the first or second
concern of 29 percent of respondents. All other issues, such as
52. See Patrick Leahy, Introductory remarks on Medical Information Privacy and
Security Act, 143 Cong. Rec. §§ 11689-11691 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997).
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terrorism, world war, and global warming had scores of 23 per-
cent or less. 3
These concerns are amplified by other, even more poignant
surveys. For example, a recent national survey found over 50%
of Americans felt that computer records will make their health
care information less secure. 54 Fifty-five percent are concerned
that computer hackers will steal their information and 66% are
concerned that government and private health insurers will mis-
use their information.5 5 Twenty percent believe that their per-
sonal information has already been misused. 6 These numbers
are disturbing but, in reality, based only on subjective opinion
and may depend significantly on the tone and wording of the
survey questions.
More disturbing than the numbers quoted above but still sub-
ject to validity criticisms are the statistics from the same survey
that seven percent of Americans feel that they have been per-
sonally harmed or embarrassed by improper disclosure of their
health information.57 However there is no clear definition of
"harmed," no quantification of the extent of the harm and no
questioning of whether embarrassment merits federal protec-
tion. Fifteen percent claim that they have personally taken steps
to protect sensitive information such as changing physicians,
paying out of pocket for covered expenses, giving inaccurate in-
formation to their physician or avoiding care altogether. 58 How-
ever, no objective data confirm these numbers.
Another approach to assess actual harm is to examine court
cases in which individuals have felt sufficiently damaged to sue.
A Westlaw search for court cases about medical privacy viola-
tions between 1990 and the present revealed fewer than 200
hits.59 Interestingly, however, the majority of those cases were
suits against governmental entities that are specifically excluded
53. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information; 64 Fed.
Reg. at 59919.
54. California Healthcare Foundation, Americans Worry About the Privacy of
Their Computerized Medical Records (Jan. 1999) <http://www.chcf.org/press/
viewpress.cfm?itemlD=362>.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Westlaw search on the ALLCASES database using the terms: (MEDICAL) /
P (INFORMATION OR RECORD!) /P ("RIGHT OF PRIVACY" OR "RIGHT TO
PRIVACY" OR PRIVA!) [P (VIOLATION) & DA(AFT Jan 1, 1990) performed 3/
14/00.
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by SPIIHI. Unfortunately, this method of estimating damages
also has its limits in that it only captures reported cases.
Currently, there is no reliable definition of the actual extent
to which medical information privacy has been violated. The
potential certainly exists but is that potential really a serious
problem? Before embarking on a course that radically alters
how medical information is handled by all providers, insurers
and other entities covered by SPIIHI.60 HHS should have un-
dertaken a formal study to determine the actual extent of the
problem so that it could properly triage limited resources to the
most effective solutions.
C. Who is Likely to Misuse Health Information?
An alternative approach to protecting medical record privacy
would be to determine which entities are most likely to misuse
that information and tailor protection efforts accordingly. SPI-
IHI ignores this approach altogether and instead tries to extend
its regulatory power to reach all possible threats, not only enti-
ties specifically covered by HIPAA but extending that reach
through contractual arrangements to reach the business partners
of those entities. 61 SPIIHI also burdens patients with the diffi-
cult and possibly illusory task of negotiating how much of their
privacy they are willing to relinquish.
Whether one prefers to quote Willie Sutton's famous explana-
tion about robbing banks "because that is where the money is"
or Woodward's Watergate observation about "following the
money," both highlight the logic of focusing IIHI protection ef-
forts on instances where IIHI can be used to substantially profit
commercial entities. (Other privacy infractions are likely not
worth the cost of implementation and enforcement of Federal
regulations and are probably dealt with more effectively at a lo-
cal level.) Doing so, in effect, reduces the field to three major
categories of organizations that can process information on a
sufficient scale to make it profitable: the three major credit bu-
reaus, insurance companies (through the Medical Information
Bureau), and governments.62 Interestingly, all three of these
60. See infra Part IV(D)(3) (financial impact of SPIIHI); see also discussion infra
Part V (B) (closed pool of health care dollars).
61. See infra Part IV(B)(3) (covered entities and business partners).
62. The three major credit bureaus which collectively claim to issue four billion
credit reports per year and their contact numbers are Equifax at (800) 685-1111, Ex-
perian at (800) 682-7654, and Trans Union at (800) 888-4213.
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entities have a history of abusing private information for institu-
tional goals.
This necessity for economy of scale required to realize profits
is important because it provides the impetus to invade privacy
on a scale that is larger than the current privacy laws can ad-
dress. The three major credit bureaus maintain more than 400
million records in order to generate the necessary scale to profit
from that information.63 Insurance companies did not find indi-
vidual corporate data collection sufficient to provide profitable
information so they united to form the Medical Information Bu-
reau.64 In contrast, the offices of physicians and other providers
and hospitals are not likely to make substantial profits by misus-
ing their patient's private information. The scale is too small to
allow sufficient profits to justify the risk of detection and loss of
patient confidence. Thus these entities should probably not be
included in SPIIHI at all.
III. FEDERAL PRIVACY LEGISLATION: HIPAA AND BEYOND
No "right" of privacy for health information is specifically de-
fined by HIPAA.65 HIPAA mentions the term privacy nine
times but never as a right. Rather, it consistently discusses the
"need" for privacy of certain health information. On the other
hand, the proposed rules begin with the premise that "privacy is
a fundamental right ' 66 and infer that cost should be a secondary
63. See DECEW, supra note 8, at 146.
64. MIB was founded in 1938. Based out of Boston, it is an organization with
approximately 750 member insurance companies. It collects and furnishes informa-
tion on consumers to all MIB members for use in the insurance underwriting process.
In addition to an individual's credit history, data collected by MIB may include medi-
cal conditions, driving records, criminal activity, and participation in hazardous sports,
among other facts. MIB's member companies account for 99 percent of the individual
life insurance policies and 80 percent of all health and disability policies issued in the
United States and Canada. The MIB does not have a file on everyone. Approxi-
mately 15 million Americans and Canadians are on file in the MIB's computers. If
you think your medical information is on file, you may want to be sure it is correct.
You can obtain a copy ($8.50) by writing to: Medical Information Bureau, P.O. Box
105, Essex Station, Boston, MA 02112, or call (617) 426-3660. For more information,
you may visit the following web sites: <http://bullybusters.org/home/twd/bb/legal/
mib.html> and <http://www.mib.com>.
65. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
66. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.
Reg. 59918, 60008 (1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-164) (proposed Sept. 11,
1999).
[Vol. 9
16
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol9/iss1/3
Proposed Federal Health Privacy Regulations
consideration to these rules which "promote the view that pri-
vacy protection is an important personal right. '67
A. HIPAA in General
The primary purpose of HIPAA is stated in the Act itself
which provides that HIPAA is intended as:
[a]n act . . .to improve portability and continuity of health
insurance coverage in group and individual markets, to combat
waste, fraud and abuse in health insurance and health care de-
livery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to im-
prove access to long term care services and coverage, to
simplify the administration of health insurance, and for other
purposes.68
Nowhere does the purpose statement specifically mention a pri-
mary intention to guarantee the security of individually identifi-
able health information (IIHI) nor can that purpose be implied
from any of the explicitly stated purposes. The intent to protect
that information falls into the catch-all category of "other pur-
poses." The purpose statement does, however, explicitly men-
tion the intent to simplify and thus, by implication, reduce the
cost of health care insurance administration. This is an impor-
tant observation which will be amplified in the subsequent sec-
tions but deserves reemphasis here: HIPAA's primary purpose
is at least arguably related to cost and efficiency whereas its
mandate to protect privacy is mentioned only secondarily under
the umbrella of "other purposes."
However, in fairness, HIPAA is an extraordinarily broad law
touching many different areas of healthcare. In addition to its
own provisions, HIPAA amended the Employee Retirement Se-
curity Act of 1974, (ERISA),69 the Public Health Service Act,
(PHS),70 and the Internal Revenue Code.71
HIPAA is divided into five separate sections with little tying
them together. These include: Title I, addressing healthcare ac-
cess, portability and renewability; Title II, dealing with health-
care fraud; Title III, creating medical savings accounts and
speaking to long term medical care, consumer protection and
67. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 60007.
68. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (emphasis added).
69. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994); see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (1994).
70. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-299 (1994); see, e.g., 42 USC § 300gg-41 (1994).
71. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9833 (1997). See Katherine Benesch, Healthcare
Fraud Criminalization Growing, 7 N.J. LAW. 1422 (1998).
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organ transplantation efforts; Title IV, regulating private group
health insurance plans; and Title V, amending the Tax Code in
the area of revenue offsets.72 Overall, HIPAA encompasses
more than one hundred fifty single spaced typewritten pages.73
Buried deeply within Title II (the division on fraud and abuse)
rather than in Title III (the division on consumer protection),
accounting for less than a single page of the one hundred fifty
page document, is Section 264 entitled "Recommendations With
Respect to Privacy of Certain Health Information. 74
Section 264 of HIPAA, is intimately related to Section 262
entitled "Administrative Simplification. 7 5 Section 262 man-
dates administrative simplification intended to facilitate process-
ing health care payments by promoting standard formats for
electronic information exchange.7 6 The drafters of HIPAA real-
ized that standardization of database configurations and the in-
creased use of electronic technology would further decrease the
already tenuous security of IIHI. Fearing that the public would
not continue to accept the fact that their health information had
less protection than their financial data, almost as an after-
thought, Congress included a provision to stimulate develop-
ment of electronic safeguards for health information, HIPAA
section 264.
Section 264 of HIPAA is a short, concise statement of Con-
gressional intent to protect the privacy of certain IIHI transmit-
ted in electronic data exchanges.77 It required HHS to submit to
the Senate Committees of Labor and of Human Resources and
Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means detailed
recommendations on standards with respect to the privacy of in-
dividually identifiable health information by August 1997.78 It
further required those recommendations address three distinct
subjects:
(1) The rights that an individual who is a subject of individu-
ally identifiable health information should have.
72. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
73. The page numbers used for HIPAA in this article were generated by
downloading the referenced documents from Westlaw and printing them in a single-
spaced 12 point font format on 12/1/99.
74. See id. § 264, 110 Stat. at 2033.
75. See id. § 262, 110 Stat. at 2021.
76. See Alexander Brittin et al., Understanding HHS's Proposed Health Informa-
tion Privacy Standard, 8 BNA HEALTH LAW REP. 1949, 1950 (1999).
77. See generally HIPAA, § 264.
78. See id. § 264 (a).
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(2) The procedures that should be established for the exercise
of such rights.
(3) The uses and disclosures of such information that should
be authorized or required.79
HHS delivered these recommendations to Congress on Sep-
tember 11, 1997.80 However, between September 11, 1997 and
August 21, 1999 Congress failed to reach sufficient consensus to
pass legislation governing the privacy of IIHI transmitted in
connection with transactions defined in the Social Security
Act.81 This is not to say that Congress did not make an effort;
multiple bills and resolutions were submitted each year by mem-
bers of both political parties, but none made it out of
committee.82
Congress' failure to enact legislation protecting IIHI by Au-
gust 21, 1999, triggered part (c) of HIPAA section 264.83 This
section provided that HHS must promulgate final regulations
concerning such standards by February 2000. These regulations
were clearly intended to be a floor of minimum protection and
explicitly would not preempt more stringent state laws.84
Arguably the purpose of such regulations was not to give
HHS legislative authority but rather to be an interim measure
until Congress could pass the necessary, more stringent legisla-
tion. It is important also to note that the particular transactions
subject to HIPAA mandates are not expansive. They are lim-
ited to explicit financial and administrative transactions defined
by the statute85 or transactions deemed by the Secretary of HHS
to be consistent with the two precise, limited objectives: specifi-
cally the "goals of improving the operation of the health care
system and reducing administrative costs. '86
79. Id. § 264 (b).
80. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. 59918, 59920 (1999) (proposed). Full text of recommendations available at
<http//aspe.hhs.gov/adminsimp/pvcrec.htm> (visited Feb. 22, 2000).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (1994).
82. See, e.g., The Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1997, H.R. 52, 105th
Cong. (1997); Medical Information Privacy and Security Act, S. 1368, 105th Cong.
(1997); The Medical Records Confidentiality Act, S. 1360, 104th Cong. (1995); and
Medical Information Protection Act, S. 881 106th Cong. (1999).
83. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1320 (d)(2)(c) (date).
84. See id. § 1320 (d)(2)(c)(2).
85. The statute specifically defines the covered transactions as health claims or
equivalent encounter information and attachments, enrollment and disenrollment in-
formation, eligibility and payment information, health status claims, and referral certi-
fication and authorization. See id. § 1320 (d)(2)(a)(1 and 2).
86. Id. § 1320(d)(2)(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
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These points prompt a second important observation: the
plain language of both HIPAA section 264 and the Social Secur-
ity Act section 1173(a) limits the scope and purpose of HHS's
mandate. In the absence of formal legislation, HHS is only au-
thorized to the promulgate regulations to "adopt standards 8 7
on a limited number and type of transactions. Those actions are
restricted to measures that both improve the operation of the
health care system AND reduce administrative costs. The man-
date is clearly not to reorganize the entire information system
employed by the healthcare industry. A reorganization of that
magnitude requires careful balancing of political interests which
only a legislative body can accomplish. This premise will be am-
plified in subsequent sections of this paper.
IV. PROPOSED RULE FOR STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY OF
INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH
INFORMATION (SPIIHI)
HHS promulgated SPIIHI on November 3, 1999.88 On Janu-
ary 5, 2000, HHS issued several corrections to the proposed
rule. 89 Taken as a whole, SPIIHI represents a radical deviation
from the traditional oversight of medical care. Although in the
past HHS has regulated the care it underwrites, personal injury
related to medical care has traditionally been adjudicated at a
state level using the authority of the states to protect the general
welfare of their population. SPIIHI represents the first attempt
by the federal government to invade the traditionally state regu-
lated protection from medical privacy violations. 90
In promulgating its proposed rule for privacy standards, HHS
generated more than six hundred pages of complex proposed
regulation and explanation. 91 HHS divided SPIIHI into ten sub-
divisions: (1) background; (2) provisions; (3) small business as-
sistance; (4) impact analysis; (5) flexibility analysis; (6) unfunded
mandates; (7) environmental impact; (8) collection of informa-
tion requirements; (9) federalism; and (10) coordination with In-
dian Tribal Governments. This section will briefly discuss each
of these subdivisions focusing primarily on the two most impor-
tant subdivisions: provisions and impact analysis.
87. Id. § 1320(d)(2)(a)(1).
88. See generally 64 Fed. Reg. 59918 - 60065 (1999).
89. See generally 65 Fed. Reg. 427-429 (2000).
90. See Cassie M. Chew & Mark Felsenthal, Clinton Releases Proposed Regula-
tion, Officials Stress Limits on HHS' Authority, 8 BNA HEALTH LAW. 1747 (1999).
91. See id.
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A. Background
SPIIHI begins with a mission statement defining the pressing
need for medical privacy standards as rooted in concerns of the
American citizenry. To support that position it quotes a Wall
Street Journal Poll that identified concern over personal privacy
as the number one public concern in front of terrorism, world
war and global warming.92 The section makes the observation
that States have variably protected this particular interest.93 It
then invokes the Congressional intent and power of the federal
government to intervene by quoting section 264 of HIPAA and
defining the problem as national in scope 94 due to the increase
in electronic communication of IIPI and interstate transmission
of data.9 5 Finally, HHS validates its own authority to promul-
gate these rules based on HIPAA section 264.96
A major concern in this background subdivision is HHS' atti-
tude toward cost. As other commentators have observed, the
emphasis of SPIIHI is primarily on creating the most compre-
hensive and effective privacy regulations possible.97 Therefore
in this sweeping reform, cost concerns are minimized. This min-
imalist attitude toward cost is exemplified in the "administrative
cost" paragraph of the background subdivision which states.
Thus, even if the rules proposed below were to impose net costs
... they would still be "consistent with" the objective of reduc-
ing administrative costs for the health care system as a whole.98
B. Provisions
This subsection is the body of the proposed rule. It is further
divided into eleven parts. Because this subsection focuses on
the actual application of the rule, it is one of the two most im-
portant subsections of SPIIHI and so this paper will briefly ad-
dress each of those parts individually.
92. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 59919.
93. See id. at 59920 (quoting a survey by the Institute for Healthcare Policy and
Research).
94. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information; 64
Fed. Reg. at 59919-59921.
95. See id. at 59920.
96. See id. at 59921.
97. See Institute for Healthcare Policy and Research, supra note 93, at i.
98. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 59922.
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1. Applicability
This part defines what entities are included and what informa-
tion is covered. 99 The proposed regulation covers three very
broad groups of entities: (1) all health plans (essentially all pri-
vate or government individual or group insurers including the
Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan ("FEHBP") which is
excluded from many federal mandates including the HIPAA
fraud provisions); 1°° (2) all health care clearinghouses (basically
any public or private entity which maintains healthcare informa-
tion including community health information systems, data re-
gistries such as tumor or trauma registries, and billing services);
and (3) all health care providers. It applies to any individually
identifiable health information which has been transmitted elec-
tronically no matter what form it takes after transmission (oral
or written) which it then defines as "protected health informa-
tion" (PHI). 10 1 Basically, once IIHI is transmitted electronically
it becomes PHI under the rule.
At first glance, this definition seems to have the potential to
miss many healthcare providers who do not routinely use elec-
tronic medical records, particularly since the vast majority of
health records in this country are still paper. However, when
any individually identifiable part of any health record is trans-
mitted electronically, even on behalf of a provider by a billing
agent, the transmitted information becomes protected. HHS ac-
knowledges that it is nearly impossible to separate the protected
from the non-protected information within a single record.
HHS suggests the solution to this is to treat all mixed medical
records as protected. The reality of medical practice is that al-
most all medical records are destined to become "mixed medical
records" thus forcing covered entities to apply the standards to
all parts of all medical records.
99. See id. at 59927-28.
100. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 204 (1996) (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1320 a-7 (f) which defines Federal
Health Plan as "any plan or program that provides health benefits, whether directly,
through insurance, or otherwise, which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the
United States Government (other than the health insurance program under chapter
89 of Title 5)" specifically excepting the FEHBP from coverage).
101. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 59937.
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2. Definitions
The definition part of SPIIHI, nearly twenty pages long,102
generally reinforces HHS' purpose of casting as wide a net as
possible when protecting IIHI, as illustrated above. One particu-
larly difficult conundrum is identifying the mechanism to de-
identify health data. De-identified IIHI is defined as informa-
tion that has been stripped of the potential to be linked to a
specific individual. 10 3 The rules create a safe harbor of sorts for
data which will be classified as "de-identified," but that safe har-
bor creates only a rebuttable presumption of sufficient de-iden-
tification which could be overcome in a civil or criminal action
and thus may induce a flurry of litigation.
3. General Rules
The purpose statement at the beginning of the general rules
part again reflects the Secretary's broad purpose to regulate all
IIHI. 10 4 It does recognize the necessity to balance the interests
of making access to IIHI easy for healthcare purposes and diffi-
cult for other purposes but places the onus to achieve that bal-
ance on covered entities. 10 5
The default position of the rules is to assume that IIHI should
not be disclosed without a patient's specific permission subject
to a limited number of exceptions based on public policy.10 6 The
four major exceptions are treatment, payment for that treat-
ment, necessary healthcare operations and a catchall category of
"specified public and public policy-related" purposes.10 7 HHS
specifies that covered entities of all sizes and types will be sub-
ject to the same rules, acknowledging but not substantially ad-
dressing the problems associated with applying a blanket set of
regulations on organizations varying in size and shape by four to
five orders of magnitude. 08
This part then specifies general rules for the use and disclo-
sure of IIHI for treatment, payment and health care operations
and includes a special exception for psychotherapy notes. It also
102. See SPIIHI, supra at note 29.
103. See id. at 59935.
104. See id. at 59939.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See id. (applying the rules equally to all providers, regardless of size, from
rural physician offices consisting of a single provider to the largest covered entity that
may involve tens of thousands of employees).
2000]
23
Eddy: A Critical Analysis of Health and Human Services' Proposed Health
Published by LAW eCommons, 2000
Annals of Health Law
addresses research information in great detail. This part also es-
tablishes the concept of "Minimum Necessary Use and Disclo-
sure."' 0 9 This concept requires the individual evaluation of
every request for IIHI to determine the minimum quantum of
information needed to fulfill that request.
In the service of a somewhat murky purpose, the general rules
establish the right of individuals to create special or specific re-
strictions on the use of their IIHI. 11° However, it also gives a
covered entity the right to refuse that request and creates a
blanket exception to the restriction for governmental entities
and public health purposes by referencing proposed §164.510.111
HHS then acknowledges that the "right" may be difficult to vin-
dicate because most entities will simply refuse to honor such re-
quests due to cost considerations.
In the struggle to reach entities not covered by HIPAA legis-
lation, the general rule holds covered entities liable for viola-
tions perpetrated by their business associates. 11 In doing this,
the Secretary goes so far as to enunciate specifications for the
contracts between covered entities and their business
partners. 1 3
HHS also holds covered entities liable for the information
practices they agree to and publish under the notice require-
ments of §164.512, which include both posting of a notice and
delivery of a notice to the patient."14
Finally, the general rules also outline in detail the process by
which IIHI can be "de-identified," limit the scope of protection
to two years after an individual's death and define how the rule
is applied to sub-parts of uncovered entities that conduct health
care activities such as school or employer clinics.115
4. Uses and Disclosures with Individual Authorization
This part addresses the requirements when PHI is disclosed
pursuant to an individual's explicit authorization. HHS reiter-
ates the default position that no PHI can be disclosed without
authorization by the individual or law and its intention that
109. See id. at 59943-45.
110. See id. at 60056.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 59947-50.
113. See id. at 59948.
114. See id. at 60059 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.512); see also id. at 60049
(model notice at Appendix A).
115. See id. at 59946, 59950.
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these rules not "interfere with normal uses and disclosures" of
PHI in the delivery of and payment for health care.' 16
HHS divides explicit authorization into two general groups:
disclosure requested by the patient and disclosure requested by
the covered entity.' 7 It rationalizes this approach by hypothe-
sizing that when individuals initiate authorizations they are
more likely to understand the purpose of the disclosure and to
intend self benefit. 118 In the case of patient requested disclo-
sure, no limits are placed on disclosure other than a description
of the requested information and the disclosing and receiving
entities." 9 No statement of purpose is required. 120 Under SPI-
IHI, the covered entity seems to have the responsibility to assess
the request and determine if the individual has "a clear under-
standing of what information is to be disclosed under the cir-
cumstances" although HHS states it would not be "feasible to
ask covered entities to make judgments about intended uses. "121
At times it may be difficult to determine if the individual has a
clear understanding of the information she is divulging if the
purpose of that disclosure is unknown.
The requirements when a covered entity requests disclosure
of PHI are more rigorous and are intended to prevent coercion
of the individual by the entity. 2 2 In this case, the disclosure
form must at a minimum identify the purpose of the disclosure
and the proposed uses of the information and specifically for-
bids blanket authorizations. 123 HHS clearly intends that the
level of patient understanding required for disclosure parallels
the medical standard of informed consent with the duty flowing
from the covered entity to the individual. 124 The covered entity
116. Id. at 59951 (emphasis added) (Although this part does not specifically define
normal presumably it includes all situations where explicit disclosure is not required
including law enforcement and other governmental needs).
117. See id.
118. See id. This level of sophistication from patients in healthy situations may be
fallacious, let alone in the throes of disease. Is it really likely that the average patient
actually knows how her information will be used by a life insurance company, em-
ployer or in tort litigation? In the latter case the patient is shifting the information to
a non-covered entity with no more reason to trust that person than they have to trust
their health care provider.
119. See id. at 59952.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 59953.
123. See id. at 60055-56 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.508).
124. See id. at 59953.
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has the explicit duty to disclose any financial interest in the
authorization. 125
SPIIHI imposes a plain language requirement on all authori-
zations, prohibits the conditioning of treatment or payment on
disclosure of information not directly related to that treatment
or payment, and provides example disclosure forms.126 It also
requires covered entities to keep track of all disclosures, provide
the patient a record of those disclosures on demand, maintain a
process by which an individual can revoke an authorization and
defines expired, deficient or false authorizations as no authori-
zation at all. 127
5. Uses and Disclosures without Individual Authorization
The SPIIHI preamble extensively elaborates on the rationale
behind all uses and disclosures not requiring individual authori-
zation. The principle underlying all of these uses is to "promote
key national health care priorities, and to ensure that the health
care system operates smoothly. ' 128 The Secretary states that she
considered only allowing such disclosures when affirmatively
mandated by law but rejected this notion because the excepted
activities are so important to the population as a whole. 129 The
following paragraph contains an admission that once this pro-
tected information is in the hands of many government entities,
it is no longer regulated by the act. 30 Taken together these
statements expose the presupposition that the government and
its agencies will always act in the best interest of a patient; how-
ever, in reality that interest may be eclipsed when the IIHI is
perceived critical to public health.
Generally, SPIIHI liberally permits disclosure of IIHI for
"public health activities authorized by law" stating explicitly the
intention to interpret the phrase broadly. 13 1 Presumably this in-
tention includes the interpretation of state and local law as well
as federal law which undermines the stated major purposes of
setting a uniform national floor of protection.
125. See id. at 60056 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (d) (iv)).
126. See id. at 59954.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 59955 (e.g., permitting the Center for Disease Control to gather and
process information and allowing physicians to communicate freely among themselves
regarding patient care).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 59955.
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SPIIHI also proposes to allow liberal disclosure to public and
officially designated private health oversight agencies especially,
for the purposes of combating fraud,'13 2 ensuring non-discrimina-
tion and improving quality of care.133 SPIIHI permits disclosure
to the courts and administrative agencies for use in proceedings
whenever the information relates to a party of the proceeding or
is ordered by a court or administrative tribunal and does not
require the protection of a formal judicial subpoena.1 34 Law en-
forcement is similarly entitled to wide unauthorized disclosure
pursuant only to administrative process, civil investigative de-
mand or perhaps even only a reasonable suspicion standard.1 35
Again, states may vary widely in the amount of medical infor-
mation they permit law enforcement to access pursuant to the
state's police powers thus also undermining SPIIHI's purpose of
setting a national floor of protection.
The rules permit a blanket exclusion to use IIHI for "research
purposes" regardless of funding source or sources. 136  This ex-
clusion is subject to the protections of an institutional review
board or a privacy board as defined in the rules. 37 Research is
defined broadly as "a systematic investigation, including re-
search development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop
or contribute to generalizable knowledge.1 38  "Generalizable
knowledge" is knowledge related to health that can be applied
to populations outside of the population served by the covered
entity."' 39
HHS depends on the institutional review or privacy boards to
balance the privacy interests of the individuals whose privacy is
132. Coincidentally, the United States Department of Justice has declared health
care fraud the nation's number one white collar crime priority. See Kevin J. Darkin,
Understanding the New Health Care Fraud Legislation, 12 CRIM. JUST. 30 (1997).
133. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. 59956.
134. See id. at 60067 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (d)).
135. See id. at 59960-64 (interestingly one justification for this stance is that law
enforcement may urgently need medical information when pursuing a fleeing armed
suspect-a justification that frankly eludes the creative imagination of this author espe-
cially in light of the fact that the information can only be released if the records
sought are relevant and material to the inquiry, the request is as specific and narrow
as practicable, and deidentified information could not be reasonably substituted; a
three part test that may require quite a bit of creative thought during hot pursuit).
136. See generally id. at 59967-59971, 60053 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.510
0)).
137. See generally id.
138. See id. at 59967.
139. See id. at 59967-71, 60053 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.504).
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invaded against the greater benefit of the research to society. 140
Using these definitions and restrictions as the rules are currently
written, a large insurance company could assemble a "privacy
board" with a single member from an outside entity and ap-
prove cleverly written "research protocols" fulfilling the techni-
cal requirements of the rule but producing results which never
intended to benefit the consumer. 141 Additionally, since there
are no requirements to report non-federally funded research
projects to a central agency, discovery of an unscrupulous prac-
tice would be primarily complaint driven. Such a protocol could
be easily hidden in a maze of private corporate business
practices.
SPIIHI also permits liberal unauthorized disclosure to medi-
142cal examiners, state or federal governmental data systems for
use in support of policy development, regulation or manage-
ment,143 in emergency situations (defined specifically as a situa-
tion in which there is imminent threat to the health or safety of
any person or the public),144 to the military for active duty ser-
vice members, 45 to the Department of Veteran Affairs, 146 to the
intelligence community1 47 and to the State Department.1 48 It
permits more limited disclosures for use in hospital directories
requiring permission from patients with capacity and assuming
permission from patients without capacity. 149 It also permits dis-
closure to next of kin (or other family member or close personal
friend),'150 for use in banking and payment processes,' 5' and
other uses "as required by law.' '1 52
140. See id. at 60058.
141. See id. at 60058 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (j)).
142. See id. at 59960.
143. See id. at 59964.
144. See id. at 60058 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (k)).
145. See id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (m)).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 59965-66.
150. See id. at 60058 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (1)). It is hard to under-
stand the need for this provision that defers to local applicable law and ethics to cod-
ify an already existing responsibility which varies greatly from state to state. It is
further mystery that next of kin is carefully defined but close personal friend is not
and requires no identity check to confirm.
151. See id. at 59966-67.
152. Id. at 60059 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (m)).
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6. Rights of Individuals
SPIIHI is specifically intended to create what HHS describes
as "four basic individual rights:" (1) the right to written notice of
information practices; (2) the right of an individual to obtain ac-
cess to her own IIHI; (3) the right to an accounting of how an
individual's IIHI has been disclosed; and (4) the right to request
amendment and correction of PHI. 53 SPIIHI strictly regulates
the exact quantum of notice to which an individual has a right.
This right to notice includes a "plain language" mandate, an ex-
plicit statement of all four rights and how to vindicate them, and
a statement of required components of the notice. 54
7. Administrative Requirements
This part is intended to compel covered entities to establish
certain safeguards for PHI including designating a privacy offi-
cial, training the members of their workforce about privacy re-
quirements, and establishing sanctions for members of an
entity's workforce who violate the policies and procedures.' 55 It
also establishes a duty to mitigate the harm caused by any inad-
vertent disclosure of PHI.156
8. Development and Documentation of
Policies and Procedures
This part of SPIIHI instructs covered entities to develop and
document written policies and procedures for implementing the
requirements of this rule. 157 In essence, even the smallest solo
practitioner's office would be required to have a policy and pro-
cedures manual and to store the records of all transactions cov-
ered by this rule for a minimum of six years. HHS emphasizes
that the scale of the written policies should match the size of the
institution.158 Those policies would include how PHI is used and
disclosed, how requests for restricting uses and disclosures are
153. See id. at 59976-88, 60059-62 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.512, 164.514,
164.515, 164.516).
154. See id.
155. See generally id. at 59988-91, 60061-62 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.518).
156. See id. at 60062 (1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.518(f)).
157. See generally id. at 59991-94, 60062-63 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.520).
158. See id. at 59992. (One suggestion that is made is for smaller institutions to
restrict access to a single employee-a completely unworkable solution. In the opinion
of this author, this suggestion, while well intended, underscores the lack of knowledge
on the part of SPIIHI's drafters about how medical offices function, especially in un-
derserved rural areas.)
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honored, how disclosures are tracked, how the administrative
requirements are met, how notice of information practices is
provided to patients, a policy for patient inspection and copying
of records, and a procedure to allow amendment of the records.
Covered entities would also be required to keep samples of all
relevant forms.
9. Relationship to Other Laws
SPIIHI, reflecting HIPAA's explicit mandate, specifically sets
out a general rule that state law provisions contrary to its pro-
visions or requirements are preempted. 159 The rule states that
HHS does not intend to preempt all state regulation by occupy-
ing the entire field. Rather, the rule is intended only to preempt
conflicting laws.160 The statute provides three exceptions to this
general rule: (1) for state laws which address controlled sub-
stances; (2) for state laws relating to IIHI that are contrary to
and more stringent than the federal requirements; and (3) a
catchall category to prioritize state laws which the Secretary of
HHS determines are necessary to prevent fraud and abuse, to
ensure regulation of insurance and health plans, for state report-
ing on health care delivery, and for other purposes. 16 1 HHS
clarifies five ambiguities in interpreting HIPAA and the rule in-
cluding the precise definitions of "provision of," "contrary to,"
and "state law;" the meaning of "relates to the privacy of IIHI;"
and the definition of "more stringent." It then attempts to pre-
empt confusion and avoid potential litigation over these terms
by enunciating its own position on their interpretation. 62
HHS also articulates its official position of how SPIIHI inter-
relates to existing federal laws. 163 The language of this section
takes on an almost judicial quality as it discusses the principles
of statutory interpretation behinds its position.164 This part ends
by concluding that SPIIHI does not preempt the Privacy Act, 65
more stringent privacy requirements of the Substance Abuse
159. See id. at 59994-99.
160. See id. at 59994.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 59994-99.
163. See id. at 59999-60002.
164. See id. at 59999-60000.
165. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1999).
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Confidentiality Regulations, 166 or settled ERISA preemptionlaw. 167
10. Compliance and Enforcement
Though initially the enforcement of compliance with SPIIHI
will be largely complaint driven, HHS also anticipates an active
program to monitor and review entity compliance. 168 Individual
complaints directly to the Secretary will undoubtedly be burden-
some but may result in a better clarification of the scope of the
problem of privacy violation. 169
The rules as written stress cooperation to achieve compliance,
anticipating HHS would offer technical assistance and gui-
dance.17 0 Whether HHS and its investigative division, the Office
of the Inspector General (OIG), actually have the human re-
sources to accomplish a task of this magnitude remains to be
seen.
171
Although § 264 of HIPAA does not specifically outline penal-
ties for privacy violations, HHS assumes that §§ 1176 and 1177
will apply to SPIIHI. HHS, without further explanation, as-
sumes that SPIIHI is subject to HIPAA's two-pronged approach
to enforcement. 172 It asserts that the Secretary has the authority
to impose civil monetary penalties against those covered entities
166. See 42 C.F.R. part 2 (1999).
167. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (1999).
168. See generally Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infor-
mation, 64 Fed. Reg. 60002-03, 60063-64 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.522).
169. As is argued in other sections of this paper, perhaps identifying the problem
should have been the first step, taken prior to the development of this rule.
170. See generally Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infor-
mation, 64 Fed. Reg. 60063-64 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.522).
171. See generally OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Gain Sharing Arrangements
and Civil Monetary Penalties for Hospital Payments to Physicians to Reduce or Limit
Services to Beneficiaries, 64 Fed. Reg. 37985 (1999). Unfortunately, it appears that
the OIG has the sentiment that when Congress passed HIPAA, it failed to adequately
provide for the increased manpower such advisory opinions require. In its SAB, the
OIG states that gain-sharing arrangements "pose a high risk of abuse." It opines that
such arrangements "will require ongoing oversight both as to quality of care and
fraud" and declares that it has "neither the resources nor the expertise to police a
multitude of such arrangements on an ongoing basis." Id. at 37987. Finally OIG com-
pletely throws up its hands calling for legislative rather than administrative resolution
of the gain-sharing quagmire stating that "case by case determinations by advisory
opinions are an inadequate and inequitable substitute for comprehensive and uniform
regulation." OIG itself has strongly implied that it currently lacks the resources to
fulfill its existing commitments to individually review potential gain-sharing
arrangements.
172. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60003.
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that fail to comply in accordance with HIPAA § 1176.173 These
penalties are to be imposed according to the procedures estab-
lished for imposition of civil monetary penalties in HIPAA. 174
The penalties are capped at $25,000 per year for each inadver-
tent violation. Also, SPIIHI asserts that HIPAA § 1177 estab-
lishes criminal penalties of up to ten years imprisonment and
$250,000 for certain intentional wrongful disclosures of individu-
ally identifiable health information. 175
It is important to underscore the fact that the entire burden
for enforcement of this provision falls on HHS. There is no pri-
vate right of action. Therefore, while SPIIHI may set some min-
imum standards for privacy that will be useful in establishing a
standard of care for tort suits by individuals whose information
has been misused, it does not provide any avenue to either
streamline, enhance or insure recovery for individuals damaged
by a covered entity's failure to comply with these standards.
11. Effective Date
A covered entity must be in compliance not later than 24
months following the effective date of the final rule, except for a
small health plan that has 36 months to comply. 176
C. Small Business Assistance
SPIIHI establishes the first federally required regime of infor-
mation practices for private medical industry.177 Recognizing
that the complexity of SPIIHI could suggest that the require-
ments imposed on small businesses (comprising eighty-five per-
cent of the medical industry) may be too costly and
burdensome, HHS promulgated this section to assist small busi-
nesses with compliance. 78 It states that physicians who disclose
patient information only in routine medical business could do so
without any change in current practices. 179 While this may be
possible in some very small number of cases, most doctors will
be required to occasionally give out some IIHI requiring that
173. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 1176, 110 Stat. 1936, 2028 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5).
174. See id. (referencing § 1128A).
175. See id. § 1177 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (1999)).
176. See generally Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infor-
mation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 60064 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.524).
177. See id. at 60003.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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they at least implement the practices and procedures required
by the rule even if they rarely use them. Perhaps a better ap-
proach would be to eliminate health care providers from the
rule altogether.
The Secretary also states that HHS plans to engage in out-
reach and education programs to ease the implementation of
this rule for small businesses, pledging to work with professional
associations 180 to provide the greatest possible guidance to small
businesses covered by this rule.1 81  This again raises the ques-
tion of whether has the resources to fulfill its obligations.1 82
As a gesture of its intent to live up to this pledge, HHS de-
votes approximately three pages of its six hundred page docu-
ment to setting out fourteen principal (though emphatically not
exclusive) requirements. These principal statements are simply
more concise reiterations of the guidelines outlined in the docu-
ment as a whole. This section does not substantively exempt
small businesses from any of the rule's burdens.
D. Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis
This section of SPIIHI is divided into seven parts: (1) the re-
lationship of the analysis to other HIPAA regulations; (2) a
summary of costs and benefits; (3) the need for the proposed
action; (4) baseline privacy protections; (5) costs; (6) benefits;
and (7) an examination of alternative approaches. These areas
can be conveniently grouped under four major headings: an in-
troduction to the problem (parts one and two), rationale for reg-
ulation of IIHI (part three), actual impact analysis (parts four,
five and six), and alternatives (part seven). This section will dis-
cuss each of those four major areas in turn.
180. While this is potentially a place to begin reaching physicians, it is important
to remember that only about 40% of licensed physicians belong to the AMA, the
largest professional association for small physician small businesses.
181. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60003.
182. Small providers already complain bitterly that HHS fails to provide them
adequate guidance in trying to comply with the fraud and abuse requirements of
HIPAA. Personal interview with Joan Ashley, director of the Medicaid Surveillance
Utilization Review Service (SURS) in Helena, Montana 4/6/99.
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1. Introduction to the Problem
Based on several federal requirements, 83 the SPIIHI pream-
ble sets out a "preliminary impact analysis" concerning the ef-
fects of the proposed rule. 84 However, in doing so, HHS goes
beyond a dispassionate impact analysis and issues a statement
strongly advocating global extensive regulation of IIHI that is
more a cost/benefit breakdown than an impact analysis. 85 The
Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995 requires a cost/benefit discus-
sion but by interweaving the impact analysis with a discussion of
costs compared to benefits, the raw impact of the rule is ob-
scured by an argument highlighting the benefits of the rule.186
HHS starts by stating it has three basic objectives in promul-
gating SPIIHI: (1) to establish baseline standards for health
care privacy protection; (2) to establish a uniform base protec-
tion for all health information maintained or transmitted by cov-
ered entities; (3) protect the privacy of health information
maintained in electronic form as well as information generated
by electronic systems. 87 It acknowledges the difficulties inher-
ent in measuring the costs of these objectives because there is
very little data available on the financial impact of privacy pro-
tection.1 88 The economic burdens of several elements are simply
omitted because HHS could not make realistic estimates. 89
However HHS does acknowledge that the cost of these burdens
will be significant. 190 Further, HHS' financial analysis is not
based on total costs of its implementation but rather the incre-
mental costs above those attributable to other HIPAA regula-
tions, adding more error into a system in which accuracy is
already questionable. 91 HHS also observes benefits are even
harder to quantify than costs given the underlying assumption
183. See 5 U.S.C. §804 (2) (1999); see also Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg.
51,735 (1993) (requiring an impact analysis for regulations that exceed certain levels
of impact).
184. See generally Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infor-
mation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 60005-36.
185. See id. at 60006.
186. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4.
187. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60005.
188. See id. at 60006.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
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that privacy is primarily a "right" and a "commodity" only
secondarily. 192
2. The Need for the Proposed Action
This part is misnamed. It should really be entitled "a justifica-
tion for the extent of the proposed action." The "need" for a
regulation enunciating medical privacy standards is explicit in
HIPAA § 264 (C). 1 9 3 Further, few would argue with the concept
that IIHI merits some type of protection. The more important
issue is to what extent and at what cost the federal government
should be in the business of protecting IIHI.
HHS' argument for extensive administrative control is based
on a statement of the worst case scenario:
If the medical system shifts to predominantly electronic medi-
cal records in the near future, without the use of accompany-
ing privacy rules, then one can imagine a near future where
clerical and medical workers all over the country may be able
to pull up protected health information about individuals - -
without meaningful patient consent and without effective insti-
tutional controls against further dissemination.194
The argument is reinforced by HHS' position that:
Privacy is a fundamental right... [and] has to be viewed differ-
ently than any ordinary economic good. Although the costs
and benefits of a regulation need to be considered as a means
of identifying and weighing options, it is important not to lose
sight of the inherent meaning of privacy: it speaks to our indi-
vidual and collective freedom. 95
HHS' clear message is that the privacy of IIHI is in clear and
present danger and the urgent duty to protect that information
supersedes financial considerations based on the fundamental
right to privacy.
HHS develops this argument based on the concept of market
asymmetry and the growth of information technology. Patients
have less information about how their IIHI will be used and less
power to demand protection than the organizations collecting
the information. 96 Companies have an incentive to overuse
IIHI based on the dollar value of that information both inter-
192. See id.
193. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 264 (c), 119 Stat. 2033 (1996).
194. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60009.
195. Id. at 60008.
196. See id. at 60008-09.
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nally through non-permissive misuse and externally through sale
of IIHI to other companies which value it.197 HHS makes the
point that in the current milieu it is expensive and ineffective for
a patient to try to personally monitor and control what is done
with their IIHI. 198 These difficulties are enhanced by the third
party nature of insurance and payment systems which may deny
patients the standing to protect their IIHI.' 99 Essentially, pa-
tients trade financial risk imposed by uncertain healthcare ex-
penses for control over their IIHI.
HHS emphasizes the recent and escalating nature of the prob-
lem by noting that with paper records, the risk of information
misuse is low because it was expensive and time consuming to
access and duplicate medical records but with internet technol-
ogy, electronic information can be accessed, processed and used
immediately and inexpensively. 2°° HHS assumes that given the
current commercial incentives and barriers to individual patient
control, misuse of IIHI will dramatically increase. Lastly HHS
makes the point that lack of privacy safeguards may adversely
affect health care delivery compromising efficiency through
foregone or inappropriate treatment due to patient reluctance
to share information with physicians.2 °'
Taken in its entirety, HHS has put forth an interesting, but
fatally flawed argument for global administrative regulation of
all IIHI. The lethal fault is that HHS has failed to adequately
prioritize spending. In a political climate where the American
legal system has not even yet recognized access to health care 202
as a "fundamental right," HHS argues that the right to protect
information generated in the health care delivery process is fun-
damental and justifies major expenditures. While the country
struggles to come to grips with the reality that the finite re-
sources available to deliver health care demand cost contain-
ment and even rationing, HHS maintains that the cost of
protecting IIHI is superseded by the urgent need for absolute
confidentiality.
197. See id. at 60009.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. Clearly a major sticking point in the concept of a fundamental right to health
care is the inability to agree on what the definition of health care encompasses and
what subset of that care is implicitly fundamentally due to citizens under the penum-
bras of the explicit rights.
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Prioritizing the spending of health care dollars is the adminis-
trative equivalent of medical triage. Within this analogy, HHS
mis-triages the value of privacy. It focuses on a relatively minor
wound (privacy invasion) in the midst of a life threatening injury
(diminishing resources relative to the demand for medical care).
In essence, with SPIIHI as written, HHS applies a Band-Aid to
a skinned knee while its patient, the American populace,
exsanguinates.
3. Impact Analysis
SPIIHI's impact statement is among the most controversial
parts of the preamble to the regulation. The controversy arises
because the analysis is based on minimal hard data, ignores sev-
eral major potential costs and varies by an order of magnitude
from the only estimate of privacy regulation cost generated in
the private sector available, the Nolan Report (commissioned by
the Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association). 20 3 Accordingly, this
paper will address HHS' analysis in substantial detail and com-
pare it as closely as possible to the Nolan Report.
a. Establishing a Baseline
HHS starts its impact analysis with a determination of current
requirements and practices with regard to IIHI.2 °4 It states that
most current privacy practices stem from existing state laws or
professional codes of conduct and ethical behavior, pointing out
that states vary dramatically and professional codes do not have
the force of law. °5
Regarding professional codes of conduct, HHS identified
three major themes: (1) the need to maintain and protect IIHI;
(2) the need for policies to ensure the privacy of IIHI; and (3)
the principle that only the minimum needed information should
be released. 0 6 In the proposed regulation, HHS has added to
these principles, the right of individual access, the right of notice
regarding privacy policies, the requirement to maintain
databases of released information, and the mandate to control
business partners by contractual agreements.20 7
203. See generally Robert E. Nolan Company, supra note 50.
204. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information; 64
Fed. Reg. at 60010.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 60010-11.
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In discussing state laws which may be preempted, HHS ac-
knowledges the complexity of the state regulatory system al-
ready in effect, citing Florida's more than sixty privacy laws as
an example of that complexity.0 8 HHS acknowledges its inabil-
ity to comprehensively study the effects of SPIIHI on state laws
and its heavy reliance on the Georgetown University Privacy
Project's study on state laws, 20 9 another admittedly non-exhaus-
tive review. 210 Thus, although HHS has not looked intensively
at state laws, it reaches the conclusion that SPIIHI applies some
new standards to all states (e.g. requiring covered entities to
provide notice of privacy and access policies to patients)2 1 1 and
represents a "more level floor from which states could expand
privacy protections.... 212
b. Overview and Summary of Costs
Starting from this very sketchy determination of current levels
of privacy, HHS proceeds to estimate the costs of the increased
levels of privacy protection provided by SPIIHI.213 HHS points
out that covered entities will be implementing these regulations
at the same time they are implementing other HIPAA mandated
administrative simplification requirements making the incre-
mental increase due solely to SPIIHI difficult to determine.21 4
HHS also estimates that the regulations will affect "about 20,000
health plans ... and hundreds of thousands of providers. '21 5
HHS summarizes the cost estimate for implementation of
SPIIHI as 1.2 billion dollars for the first year and a five-year
total cost of 3.8 billion dollars (with a potential variance of be-
tween 1.8-6.3 billion).216 It then makes comparisons based on its
estimate, finding that the cost of SPIIHI represents only 0.1% of
the entire healthcare budget for the first year, 1% of the 5 year
208. See id. at 60011.
209. See Janlori Goldman, The State of Health Privacy: An Uneven Terrain,
<http://www.healthprivacy.org/resources/statereports/contents.html> (visited Mar. 1,
2000).
210. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60010.
211. See id. at 60013.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 60014-19.
214. See id. at 60014.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 60006.
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increase in healthcare spending 217 and an increased cost of $0.46
per health encounter.2 18
HHS' estimate is an order of magnitude lower than the $43
billion for the first five years published in the Nolan Report.2 19
The Nolan Report estimates the effects of the regulation will
reach twelve million providers, payers, researchers and suppliers
in 500,000 companies, not for profit organizations and research
facilities, also an order of magnitude higher than HHS'
prediction.22 °
It is important to note that HHS acknowledges that its esti-
mate completely ignores many costs because it found the data
too complex to quantify.22' These omissions include the cost of
the minimum necessary disclosure requirement, the outlay to
monitor and assume responsibility for business partners, the ex-
pense of creating de-identified data and internal complaint
processes, the potential cost of the sanctions, compliance and
enforcement, the expense to create a privacy board and desig-
nate a privacy official, and the additional financial burden of re-
search and optional disclosures.222 Ignoring such significant
potential expenditures raises a serious question about the valid-
ity of these numbers; in fact, HHS' estimates may serve as noth-
ing more than an absolute minimum cost the public could expect
to incur.
c. Initial Costs
HHS states that "initial costs . . . for the privacy standards
should be small" because many of these costs will already be
committed for implementation of other HIPAA mandates223
Although the term initial is not precisely defined, this paper will
define initial costs as one time costs for setup and training costs
whether they occur in the first year or over five years. As such
HHS' categories of Privacy Policies and Procedures, System
Compliance Costs, and Training will be considered together.
HHS allocates a development cost of $300-$3000 for providers
and $300-$15,000 for health plans totaling $395 million over five
217. See id. at 60007.
218. See id.
219. See Robert E. Nolan Company, supra note 50.
220. See id. at 2.
221. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60007.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 60015.
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years.224 HHS has previously estimated that the cost of com-
puter upgrades for all of HIPAA will total $5.8 billion dollars
over 5 years.225 It allocates $90 million to SPIIHI bringing the
total to $485 million.226 HHS also downplays the cost of training
personnel, calling it minimal and estimating it at $20/year for
provider offices and $60-100/year for health plans and hospi-
tals.227 This translates to another $110 million over five years
bringing initial costs to $595 million.228
In contrast to HHS, the Nolan Report estimates initial costs
will total $23.4 billion for five years.22 9 A strict comparison be-
tween the two estimates is not entirely valid because the two
reports use somewhat different terminology and assumptions.
However, they are similar in that both deal with the costs of
implementing the new infrastructure. The Nolan Report in-
cludes the costs of the information protection officer based on
organization size, salaries and time estimates; the cost of staff
training based on lost staff time and cost of the trainer; the cost
of computer system changes based on interviews with systems
analysts and health care executives using general mission de-
scriptions and costs of reprogramming, testing and coordination
with other systems; and the legal costs to review existing con-
tracts for compliance.23 °
d. Inspection, Copying, Amendment and Correction Costs
HHS assigns $2.44 billion in costs over five years for inspec-
tion, copying, amendment and correction costs. 231 Interestingly
it does not front load any of these costs. Given the level of con-
cern over privacy of IIHI attributed to the public by HHS and
Congress, front-loading these costs to take into account an ini-
tial rush to vindicate these new "rights" would seem prudent.
HHS estimates the increase in inspection and copying costs to
be relatively small because more than half the states already
permit this process. However, this ignores its own assumption
that notice of the existence of the right will increase awareness
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 60017.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 60015, 60017.
229. See Robert E. Nolan Company, supra note 50, at 3.
230. See id. at 9, 22-26 and Exhibits G, H, I, J.
231. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. 60016-17.
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and utilization of the right. HHS assumes administrative costs
of $10/request and copying costs of $.032 per page based on a
study done in 1998 by the Tennessee Comptroller of the Trea-
sury.232 It acknowledges that other studies have estimated sig-
nificantly higher costs but chooses this particular study based on
the criteria that older studies did not adequately account for
savings from computerization.233 However, this ignores the fact
that most records are still paper records and therefore the esti-
mate may be significantly low.
It also does not account for compliance with the new require-
ment that only the minimum necessary information is released.
This fact will increase the level of training required for those
record technicians and involve higher level decisions more
often, both of which will increase the cost of record copying.
HHS' final estimate for inspection and copying over five years is
$405 million based on an estimate that only 1.5 percent of pa-
tients will request to inspect and copy their records.234 HHS
also asserts that this sum will be paid for entirely by the con-
sumer.235 This assumption ignores the legal precedent that when
a privilege rises to the level of a right, courts often are willing to
guarantee it regardless of economic status. When a significant
segment of the population is prevented from copying their
records for financial reasons, courts may order the inspection,
copying and amendment expenses to be borne institutionally or
publicly.
In discussing the right to amend and correct the records, HHS
does estimate that requests to amend will significantly increase
over current demands.236 However, HHS assumes without ex-
planation or justification that a clerk or nurse can correct most
records.237 It also acknowledges excluding the cost to resolve
any disputes arising from disagreements over the contents of
records.238 Using a cost estimate of $75 per record amended and
assuming that two thirds of inspection requests will result in
amendment requests, HHS estimates that $2 billion will be
spent over five years on amendment and correction. 239 When
232. See id. at 60016.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 60016-17.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
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added to the $405 million dollars for inspection and copying, the
total cost estimated by HHS for inspection, copying, amend-
ment and correction comes to $2.44 billion. 40
The Nolan Report estimates that inspection, copying and
amendment will cost $3.3 billion over five years.24' It bases this
on estimates that 1.25% of hospital patients, 2.0% of ambula-
tory encounters and 0.5% of health plan patients will ask to in-
spect and copy their records. It predicts about 35% of those
would request amendment and 20% of amendments would go to
appeal.242 It then develops a task list for each process and,
based on labor costs and time allocated per task, estimates a per
transaction cost.243
e. Costs of Written Authorization
HHS estimates the cost of written authorization at $271 mil-
lion over five years based on the assumption that because au-
thorization is not required for treatment or payment disclosures,
authorization will be required in only 1% of all encounters.244
The Nolan Report on the other hand assumes that most plans
will want to collect IIHI data about patients for some reason
other than an exempted one (e.g. determinations of health cov-
erage). It again develops a task list for each process and, based
on labor costs and time allocated per task, estimates a per trans-
action cost which translated to $1.9 billion over five years for
form creation, legal review, printing, mailing, answering inquir-
ies and new data entry.2 45
f. Costs of Tracking Disclosures
HHS estimates that most of the tracking costs will be sub-
sumed in the $90 million allocated to data system costs discussed
above.246 It predicts ongoing costs would be data entry time
alone which it dismisses as de minimis.247 Thus, nothing is added
240. See id.
241. See Robert E. Nolan Company, supra note 50, at 3, 8, 20-21 and Exhibits E-1,
E-2.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 24
Fed. Reg. at 60017.
245. See Robert E. Nolan Company, supra note 50, at 3, 6, 13-14 and Exhibits A-i,
A-2, and A Support.
246. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60017.
247. Id.
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to the bottom line for costs related to tracking. It is simply un-
likely that the requirement to track disclosures will add nothing
to the costs of SPIIHI.
The Nolan Report, on the other hand, overestimates tracking
costs at $9.1 billion over five years.248 The estimate is inaccurate
because it assumes that all disclosures, including those between
individual providers for the purposes of referral and between
providers and payers for the purpose of payment, need to be
tracked ($3.9 billion disclosable encounters). 249 But, SPIIHI
stipulates that only a small percentage of disclosures will need to
be tracked. Thus the cost of tracking disclosures will likely be
less than $9.1 billion. If even one percent of all disclosures are
trackable, the five-year cost would be nearly $1 billion using the
Nolan Report's methods.
g. Other costs
Another element of SPIIHI that will generate costs is its no-
tice requirement. In this instance, the HHS and Nolan Report
estimates are relatively similar with five-year predicted costs of
$470 million 250 and $654 million251 respectively.
HHS estimates that SPIIHI will cost the Federal Government
$31 million for the necessary compliance measures associated
with privacy protection in its multiple roles as a provider and
underwriter of health care, law enforcer, public health record
keeper, and health researcher.25 2 HHS estimates costs to state
governments to be $90 million over five years mostly for ex-
penses generated in a state's role as provider and underwriter of
health care. The Nolan Report does not address these costs.
h. Benefits
HHS chooses to discuss potential benefits of SPIIHI in quali-
tative and quantitative terms. In qualitative terms, it describes
these positive effects as "important societal benefits. ' 253 These
include establishment of privacy protection as a fundamental
248. See Robert E. Nolan Company, supra note 50, at 3, 7, 15-19 and Exhibits B,
C-1, C-2, D.
249. See id. at 15 and Exhibit B.
250. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60016.
251. See Robert E. Nolan Company, supra note 50, at 20.
252. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60007.
253. Id.
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right, an increase in the public confidence about the security of
their health information, and an increase in the likelihood that
"many people" will seek treatment for particular classes of dis-
eases such as mental health conditions, certain cancers, HIV/
AIDS, and other sexually transmitted diseases,254 since sensitive
information is federally protected. HHS assumes that this
would promote earlier utilization of services and eliminate the
added cost of delayed treatments and reduce transmission of
communicable diseases.255 This assumption turns on the idea
that large numbers of people currently forego access to medical
care based on privacy fears. In reality, the reluctance to seek
medical care is more likely due to cost, fear of disease and igno-
rance. HHS also overlooks the plain fact that every increase in
utilization of the system translates into increased health care
expenditures.
In quantitative terms, HHS combines its cost estimates with
Census Bureau data and arrives at the figure of $3.41 per patient
per year additional costs for the benefit of increased IIHI secur-
ity.2 5 6 Using data on the numbers of health care encounters,
HHS arrives at a cost of $0.46 per visit. Using this cost/benefit
ratio analysis, SPIIHI may seem quite reasonably priced. How-
ever it is important to remember that the Nolan Report suggests
that these costs may be higher by a factor of ten and thus the
cost/benefit ratio would increase proportionately.
4. Alternative Approaches
HHS goes into considerable detail justifying why it chose this
particular set of regulations over other options it considered in
its mission to protect the privacy of IIHI. The general approach
HHS takes is to assert that provisions could have been more
extreme but that it took the more moderate stance. 7 Commen-
tators have suggested this section is merely a preemptive justifi-
cation aimed at the inevitable challenges. 258 While the section
provides some interesting background, these more extreme ap-
254. See id. (Making the assumption that medical privacy concerns prevent pa-
tients from obtaining early testing and screening for certain types of cancer). This
assumption is not supported by information on the ACS website referenced in the
next sentence nor any study quoted in the paper. See id. at 60019-60022.
255. See id. at 60020.
256. See id. at 60019.
257. See Brittin, supra at note 76.
258. See id.
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proaches which HHS rejected ultimately lend little to an under-
standing of the rule as it is currently written.
E. Flexibility Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act 259 requires a "flexibility analy-
sis" if a proposed rule would have a significant impact on a sub-
stantial number of "small entities" as defined by the Small
Business Act.26° In the health care industry, a small business is
defined as a business with less than $5 million in annual reve-
nues, not for profit entities and small government jurisdictions
of less than 50,000 citizens.261 Individuals (sole proprietorships)
are not considered small entities.262 Since the vast majority of
hospitals are not for profit and most physicians, even those en-
gaged in solo practices, operate as professional corporations,
small entities make up a large majority of health care busi-
nesses.263 Although, estimates of the impact on these small enti-
ties varies by an order of magnitude (see impact discussion
supra), the rule has a significant impact even using the most con-
servative estimates. 264  Therefore a flexibility analysis is
required.
A flexibility analysis must address six issues: (1) reasons for
promulgating the rule; (2) objectives and legal basis of the rule;
(3) the number and types of small businesses affected; (4) the
specific activities and costs associated with compliance; (5) op-
tions considered to minimize the burdens; and (6) other rules
that may duplicate, overlap or conflict with the proposed rule.265
The purpose of a flexibility analysis is to determine if a rule has
a differentially large burden on small versus large businesses
and ensure that the rule making body has attempted to mini-
mize a disproportionate burden on small businesses. In most
cases, larger businesses dominate an industry and therefore a
flexibility analysis protects small businesses from unfair bur-
259. See 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1999).
260. See Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-657
(1994)).
261. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60036.
262. See id.
263. Using reports form the Small Business Association, HHS estimated that
more than a million small health care businesses would be affected, about 84% of the
entire health care industry. See id. at 60036-38.
264. See supra Part IV(D)(3).
265. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60036.
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dens. In the case of health care businesses, small businesses
dominate the market and thus the flexibility analysis has less
significance apart from the general discussion in the preamble.
This paper has already addressed issues 1, 2, 3, and 6 and that
discussion will not be repeated. Issues 4 and 5 warrant some
brief consideration.
Because the proposed regulation is so onerous, HHS consid-
ered excepting small businesses altogether.266 However, since
small businesses make up 84% of the total market, it found this
course untenable.267 HHS also considered extending the time
periods for compliance but found this route inappropriate for
the same reason. 268 Thus, HHS finally decided that the regula-
tion must apply to covered entities of all types and sizes in order
to be effective.269
Having decided that it must increase the burden to small enti-
ties but also recognizing that most small health care businesses
operate close to the margin and are in an environment of mas-
sive cutbacks already, HHS advocates the concept of
"scalability" in applying SPIIHI. Unfortunately, HHS does not
precisely define scalability. It does, however, give some insight
into its meaning by stating:
The privacy standards would need to be implemented by all
covered entities, from the smallest provider to the largest,
multi-state health plan. For this reason, we propose the pri-
vacy principles and standards that covered entities must meet,
but leave the detailed policies and procedures for meeting
these standards to the discretion of each covered entity. We
intend that implementation of these standards be flexible and
scalable, to account for nature of each covered entity's busi-
ness, as well as the covered entity's size and resources. A sin-
gle approach to implementation of these requirements would
be neither economically feasible nor effective in safeguarding
health information privacy. Instead, we would require that
each covered entity assess its own needs and devise and imple-
ment privacy policies appropriate to its size, its information
practices, and its business requirements.27 °
266. See id. at 60038..
267. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60038.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information;
Proposed Rule, Fed. Reg. 59918, 59925 (1999).
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How each privacy standard would be satisfied would be busi-
ness decisions that each entity would have to make. This al-
lows the privacy standards to establish a stable baseline, yet
remain flexible enough to take advantage of developments
and methods for protecting privacy that will evolve over
time.271
Thus, in the context of this rule, scalability seems to mean that
HHS intends to take into account size, purpose and economic
status of an entity when enforcing SPIIHI. HHS then gives
some examples of how scalability could be applied in entities
varying from large insurers to individual provider offices:
We expect that sanctions would be more formally described
and consistently carried out in larger, more sophisticated enti-
ties. Smaller, less sophisticated entities would be given more
latitude and flexibility. For such smaller entities and less so-
phisticated entities, we would not expect a prescribed sanc-
tions policy, but would expect that actions be taken if repeated
instances of violations occur.272
While this plan laudably attempts to minimize burdens on
smaller entities, it opens a mine-field of potential litigation over
what is fair to expect from entities of varying size, type, and
level of sophistication.
Given its policy on scalability, HHS goes on to speculate that
absolute costs will then be lower to smaller entities but acknowl-
edges that smaller entities will bear the cost as a larger portion
of total revenue.273 HHS does not address the issue that since
smaller entities often have lesser margins of profit, this regula-
tion may have the effect of making those marginal entities,
which are particularly important in rural areas, non-viable finan-
cially. HHS ends by estimating that the average start up cost to
a small entity will be $733 and the ongoing yearly cost will be
$343. It is important to point out that these costs are based on
all the assumptions and incalculable costs stated in the impact
analysis, the accuracy of which have already been called into
question.
F. Collection of Information Requirements
The Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction
Act 274 requires HHS to estimate the hourly burden its regulation
271. See id. at 60038.
272. See id. at 60041.
273. See id.
274. See Pub. L. 104-208 (1996).
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will impose.275 HHS estimates a total yearly burden of
13,773,591 hours to comply with SPIIHI.276 Unfortunately this
estimate is subject to the same limitations as HHS' cost esti-
mates discussed earlier this article. Out of ten sections of the
rule, HHS is only able to estimate the time expenditures of six
and even these seem low. Thus, as with the cost analysis, this
hours estimate is merely the minimum amount of time that
could possibly be spent complying with this rule and may be
grossly inaccurate.
G. Federalism
Executive Order 12612 permits federal action limiting the dis-
cretion of state and local governments where, as HHS quotes,
"constitutional authority for the action is clear and certain and
the national activity is necessitated by the presence of a problem
of national scope. ' 277 HHS asserts that "[p]ersonal privacy is-
sues are widely identified as a national concern by virtue of the
scope of interstate health commerce. '278
There is no doubt that personal privacy issues are a local,
state and, as HHS points out, a national concern. However the
question of whether this national concern rises to the level of a
"national problem" is not so clear. In quoting Executive Order
12612 as partial authority for the very broad scope of this rule,
HHS fails to quote the next sentence of the order that is a cau-
tionary modifier of the quoted sentence and reads:
For the purposes of this Order: (1) It is important to recognize
the distinction between problems of national scope (which
may justify Federal action) and problems that are merely com-
mon to the States (which will not justify Federal action be-
cause individual States, acting individually or together, can
effectively deal with them).279
Thus while HIPAA clearly orders the HHS to promulgate a
rule, the question of whether the scope of the national concern
presented by the perceived threat to privacy is sufficient to jus-
tify the scope of federal action suggested by HHS' rule is still
open.
275. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60045.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 60048 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12612 § 3(b) (1987)).
278. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. 60048.
279. Exec. Order No. 12612 § 3(b) (1987), 52 Fed. Reg. 41, 685.
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H. Unfunded Mandates, Environmental Impact and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments
As discussed in section IV(D)(1), the Unfunded Mandates
Act of 1995 requires a cost benefit analysis, which HHS com-
bines with its impact analysis. In addition, the Act requires and
HHS also provides an estimate of impact on national productiv-
ity, economic growth, full employment, job creation and ex-
ports. HHS first directly acknowledges that the long run costs
of these privacy measures are likely to be passed on to pa-
tients.28 ° It seems logical that an increase in the cost of health
care will likely decrease utilization of health services, a decrease
in economic growth at least in one sector of the economy. How-
ever, HHS explicitly states that it does not expect SPIIHI to
have any substantial effect on productivity or economic growth.
Indeed, HHS opines that SPIIHI may increase the numbers of
persons seeking health care which will lead to a healthier popu-
lation which will in turn increase national productivity and eco-
nomic growth. Thus, a reader is left with the impression that
SPIIHI could have a positive, negative or no effect on national
productivity or economic growth.
In reality, there is probably no clear, rational way to predict
SPIIHI's effect on overall national productivity or economic
growth. HHS does plausibly predict that this proposal will re-
sult in some slowing of growth in traditional health care profes-
sions with an increase in fields assisting in compliance with the
rule (legal professionals and management consultants). 281 On
the surface, this seems a benign statement. In reality, this reve-
lation foretells a shift of dollars originally designated to provide
medical care into legal and administrative coffers, potentially a
negative effect. HHS concludes its unfunded mandates analysis
with the statement that SPIIHI will not likely affect exports and
predicts SPIIHI will have no significant effect on the human
environment.
Lastly, HHS indicates that it consulted with representatives of
the National Indian Health Board, the National Congress of
American Indians and the Self Governance Tribes.282 Although
the section states that questions about tribal autonomy and the
status of tribal laws were discussed, it makes no mention of the
280. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. at 60044.
281. See id.
282. See id.
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substance of those discussions.283 Further, there is no mention
of how SPIIHI would affect the poorer tribes that cannot now
provide adequate healthcare for all of their enrolled members,
yet will see dollars shifted from health care delivery to legal and
administrative arenas.
V. THE BURDENS IMPOSED BY HIPAA AND SPIIHI AND
ISSUES SURROUNDING THOSE BURDENS
Thus far, this article has highlighted two very fundamental
flaws in SPIIHI: its failure to adequately define the privacy
right it intends to protect and its failure to adequately analyze
and assess the extent of existing and potential threats to health
information privacy. In light of those flaws the paper has criti-
cally analyzed the enabling legislation (HIPAA § 264) and the
proposed rule by which HHS intends to provide privacy protec-
tions (SPIIHI) stressing the breadth of the rule, its inconsisten-
cies, and its potential cost. This analysis addressed four major
issues surrounding SPIIHI: (1) SPIIHI's enormous cost; (2) the
fact that SPIIHI may not really protect privacy at all; (3) other
excessive burdens imposed by SPIIHI; (4) potential alternative
solutions to enacting SPIIHI at this time. The remainder of this
paper will discuss these issues and suggest alternative methods
to achieve a reasonable level of privacy protection at an accept-
able cost.
A. Constitutional Issues Surrounding SPIIHI
There are three separate constitutional issues connected with
SPIIHI. The first is highlighted by the brevity of section 264 of
HIPAA raising the question of whether Congress has unconsti-
tutionally delegated legislative power to the executive branch by
failing to provide adequate direction. The second question is
whether HHS exceeded any authority properly delegated by
Congress when it struggled to make SPIIHI as broad and inclu-
sive as possible. The third subject is whether Congress' and
HHS' intrusion into medical privacy protection without proper
justification offends the principles of federalism. This section
will address each of these issues separately.
283. See id.
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1. The Legislative Mandate Delegated to HHS by HIPAA:
Is it Constitutional?
A serious question arises regarding Congress' delegation of
implementation authority to HHS in the event Congress fails to
act. Crucial to this determination is an examination of SPIIHI
through the lens of administrative law's "delegation doctrine" as
currently interpreted by the Supreme Court. Although the
United States Constitution reads "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, '284
the Supreme Court has a long history of permitting the Con-
gress to delegate significant portions of its legislative power to
administrative agencies.285 The logic behind this interpretation
is that the Congress does not have the time, resources or exper-
tise to deal with the minute details of every policy it enacts and
oversees. These delegations have become so commonplace
since FDR's New Deal that the administrative arm of the execu-
tive branch of government has been called a fourth, separate
branch of government comprising the "dynamo of the modern
social service state. '286
While Congress clearly has the authority to delegate some
part of its legislative function to administrative agencies, the
limits of that judicially overseen privilege are not precisely de-
lineated.287 Thomas Jefferson recognized and drew a line gener-
ally by observing that the Congress should focus on "great"
rather than "small" concerns.288 However, what rises to the
level of "great concern" and what is merely a "small concern"
has been argued for more than two hundred years, with the pre-
cise position of the line changing as the composition of the Su-
preme Court varied.289
In Section 264 of HIPAA, Congress itself implicitly recog-
nized that the task of developing health privacy standards was a
''great concern" belonging principally to the legislative branch
of government by requiring HHS to submit recommendations to
284. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
285. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825) (permitting Congress to delegate
certain powers, while retaining those which must be entirely regulated by the
legislature).
286. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561,
592 (1947).
287. See Wayman, 23 U.S. at 15-16.
288. See THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 424-425 (P. Ford ed. 1894).
289. See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §2.6 (1994); see
also ALFRED C. AMAN JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9-39 (1993).
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help Congress accomplish its legitimate task.29 ° Congress prop-
erly retained explicit control over this legislative duty for thirty-
six months, but, despite multiple attempts, failed to accomplish
its task within its self imposed limit. This failure triggered
HIPAA Section 264(c)(1) which automatically, summarily, and
arbitrarily transferred Congress' clearly recognized duty to the
executive branch of government.291 Under Section 264(c)(1),
Congress ordered HHS, without any further guidance, definition
of terms, or discernible standards to do the legislative work it
originally and legitimately reserved to itself. Thus a task which
was unquestionably a "great concern" and belonged to the legis-
lative branch of government at 11:59 PM on August 21, 1999,
somehow became a "small concern" abruptly delegated to HHS
at 12:01 on August 22, 1999. This action raises the very funda-
mental question of whether Congress provided sufficient direc-
tion to allow a constitutional basis for HHS to write this privacy
rule.
Congress was correct in its original implicit recognition of the
legislative nature of writing medical privacy laws. Even the pri-
mary drafter of the SPIIHI, John Fanning, senior policy analyst
at HHS, recognized that this process should be accomplished
legislatively, not administratively, saying that "legislation is the
correct way to provide the provision. "292 Unfortunately, after
the self-imposed Congressional time limit expired, HHS and Mr.
Fanning seemed to conclude that they had no choice but to fol-
low the Congress' explicit though misdirected mandate for HHS
to take over the job.
The fact that HHS produced the rule, however, does not
make it constitutional. That is a question that can ultimately be
answered only by the Supreme Court. The delegation of legisla-
tive authority to administrative agencies may be a time honored
process that has generally been given wide deference by the Su-
290. See Pub. L. No. 104-191 §264.
291. See id.
292. Cassie M. Chew & Mark Felsenthal, Clinton Releases Proposed Regulation,
Officials Stress Limits on HHS' Authority, 8 BNA HEALTH LAW. 1747, 1748 (1999)
(quoting John Fanning speaking at a teleconference on privacy and security issues in
health care sponsored by the American Bar Association's Health Law Section on Oct.
29, 1999).
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preme Court,293 but the Court has set some limits to what Con-
gress should delegate.294
These limits are particularly well articulated by the Court in
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., which said "[c]ourts
have frequently held .. . that a congressional delegation of
power to a regulatory entity must be accompanied by discerni-
ble standards, so that the delegatee's action can be measured for
its fidelity to the legislative will. '295 In Arizona v. California, the
Court made the specific point in relation to agencies that con-
sensual government requires that "the fundamental issues in our
society will be made not by appointed officials but by the body
immediately responsible to the people. '296 More recently, in
Miseretta v. United States the Court said, "we long have insisted
that the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution mandates that Congress cannot
delegate [in entirety] its legislation power to another Branch. '297
Perhaps the current jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in
this area is best summarized by Professor's Aman's eloquent
statement in his administrative law hornbook:
By consensus, it is a proper thing for Congress to identify so-
cial problems and work through the rudiments of a solution,
and then to turn the program thus established over to an
agency and its professionals for implementation: knowing that
within this frame of things the agency gains a portion of law-
making power. It is, however, quite another thing for Con-
gress not to legislate in some primary manner, but instead to
turn to an agency to say, "Here is the problem, deal with it."
Today this maneuver is likely to be seen as an unacceptable
passing of the buck, the buck being Congress's responsibility
under Article I for important choices of social policy. That
important choices of social policy ought to be made in Con-
gress - and not by unelected officials and a bureaucratic pro-
293. See e.g, Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (allowing the secretary of
the interior considerable authority over the apportionment of water from the Colo-
rado River based on the fact that the statute outlined factors which the secretary was
supposed to consider when executing his duties). For examples of what is considered
to be sufficient guidance for delegation of Congressional power to pass Congressional
challenge, see Lichter v. United States, 344 U.S. 546 (1948) and Miseretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
294. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426-27 (1944); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Connally, 337 F.Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). But see Federal Energy Admin.
v. Algonquin SNG, 426 U.S. 548 (1954).
295. 426 U.S. 668, 675 (1976) (emphasis added).
296. 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (emphasis added).
297. 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989).
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cess - seems a requirement of article I and an implication of
the Constitution's profound regard for consensual
government.298
This author is simply unable to glean even a minimal "discern-
able standard" from the half page, three hundred word provi-
sion of HIPAA to support the Constitutionality of a six hundred
page document affecting a 1.3 trillion dollar market and broadly
revolutionizing how medical data is handled and protected.
Congress' implicit admonition that "individual medical privacy
is threatened, fix it" is insufficient to pass muster as the "dis-
cernable standard" necessary for constitutionality. Further, al-
though the Supreme Court has permitted delegation of
legislative authority when Congress has explicitly deemed an
agency better equipped to handle certain details, it is unlikely to
accept the argument that a task initially explicitly reserved to
Congress itself can become constitutionally delegable based on
the passage of time rather than the enunciation of adequate
guidelines.
The process of defining and balancing competing interests in
our government has always been considered primarily the prov-
ince of elected representatives. The more complex the issues
and the more divergent the conflicting interests, the more im-
portant it is for the final compromises to be worked out on the
legislative battlefield. Thus, reinforcing Congress' original posi-
tion on privacy rules is the reality that issues of medical privacy
and the protection of IIHI are among the most complex imagi-
nable. They include individual patient interests in autonomy,
control, discrimination and dignity; societal interests in medical
research and advancement, disease prevention, ensuring the
availability of medical care to the population, law enforcement
and the cost of medical care; and interests of the commercial
sector including insurers, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals,
providers and many others. Addressing these myriad interests
requires defining the right to privacy, deciding what parties have
a legitimate interest in IIHI, determining a rank order for those
legitimate interests, analyzing how the right to privacy might be
invaded by non-legitimate interests, and finally achieving an af-
fordable and workable compromise between these multiple is-
sues. In the case of medical record privacy, the legislature is
clearly the proper arena to accomplish this process. While it is
true that the delegation doctrine has rarely been used to sweep-
298. Aman, supra note 289, at 12-13.
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ingly nullify legislation, in this instance it is a real possibility that
the Court would strike Congress' seemingly unfettered delega-
tion to HHS.
2. SPIIHI's Scope of Regulation:
Is it Constitutional?
A judicial corollary of the "delegation doctrine" is the princi-
ple that an administrative agency performing its function of leg-
islative rulemaking cannot exceed the authority properly
delegated to it by Congress. Assuming, arguendo, that
HIPAA's delegation of authority to HHS was declared constitu-
tional, SPIIHI still faces constitutional challenge in that it argua-
bly exceeds the authority Congress delegated.
The Supreme Court has used the "delegation doctrine" as a
canon of interpretation to prevent agencies from exceeding del-
egated powers. It has done this in two types of cases: (1) when
it found the agency was making decisions with inadequate data;
and (2) when it found an agency was serving too narrow an
interest.
The classic illustration of the first form of judicial control is
the "Benzene" case, Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. Amer-
ican Petroleum Inst.299 Here the Supreme Court struck down as
unconstitutional an OSHA decision attempting to reduce work-
place exposure to benzene (a known carcinogen) to extremely
low levels based on minimal data. OSHA claimed the authority
to balance the interests of potential death (however remote) due
to workplace exposure with productivity concerns, totally ignor-
ing potential costs. 300 The Court denied OSHA that authority
finding that such power properly resided in the legislative arm
of government unless explicitly delegated.
An example of an agency serving too narrow an interest can
be found in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.3° 1 In Mow Sun Wong,
a Civil Service Commission (CSC) regulation barring non-citi-
zens (including lawfully admitted resident aliens) from employ-
ment in the federal competitive civil service was held
unconstitutional, as servicing too limited a set of interests. °2
Although Mow Sun Wong is primarily a case about due process
rights, the Court stated that the federal power over aliens was
299. See 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
300. See id. at 646.
301. See 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
302. See id. at 117.
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not so plenary that any agent of the Federal Government could
arbitrarily subject all resident aliens to different substantive
rules from those applied to citizens." 3
Through HIPAA, Congress clearly delegated the authority to
protect electronic information handled by certain covered enti-
ties. HHS in analyzing its task found that simply following this
mandate would have left so many loopholes as to make the leg-
islation meaningless. Rather than re-present this problem to
Congress and request guidance, HHS' solution was to stretch its
constitutional authority to close the loopholes. In doing so, as in
Benzene, HHS assumed a non-delegated power: the power to
balance a "right to privacy" (note that this right is created in the
rule and not the enabling legislation) with the working efficiency
of the American medical system. Also similar to Benzene, the
justifications for this claim of sweeping power are rooted in non-
scientific data (surveys, anecdotes, rumor, innuendo, and sound
bites) insufficient to support such an action factually. As in
Mow Sun Wong, HHS balances one very narrow interest, the
right to privacy, against an extremely broad field of interests.
Unfortunately, by following this course, HHS exceeded its
constitutional bounds in at least two important areas. The first
area is the type of records protected. HIPAA only intended to
protect electronic records. Even President Clinton recognized
that HHS did not have the authority to regulate paper records,
stating in a press release accompanying the SPIIHI that only an
act of Congress could extend coverage to all paper medical
records.304 However, HHS constructed a complex system of re-
cord keeping that makes it nearly impossible to economically
separate paper records from electronic records, thus creating a
system that de facto regulates all paper medical records. This
exceeds its constitutional authority.
The second area that HHS exceeds its delegated authority is
in reference to the entities it attempts to cover. Congress, in
HIPAA, specifically defined the entities it intended to regulate,
restricting them to health plans, health care clearinghouses, and
to any health care provider "who transmits health information
in electronic form in connection with transactions referred to in
303. See id. at 88.
304. Chew & Felsenthal, supra note 292, at 1748 (quoting President Clinton on
Oct. 29, 1999).
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section 1173(a)(1). ' '30 5 Again, concerned over loopholes, HHS
decided to capture the business partners of covered entities by
requiring contractual provisions and holding covered entities re-
sponsible for the business practices of partners beyond their le-
gal control. This provision not only oversteps the explicit
authority granted by HIPAA, it also invades the province of the
states to regulate insurance contracts.
Following Supreme Court jurisprudence in Benzene and
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, it seems unlikely that the present
Supreme Court would support the constitutionality of SPIIHI.
HHS has simply taken too many liberties to vindicate too nar-
row an interest with too little objective data and minimal atten-
tion to cost.
3. Federalism Issues: Are They Fatal to the
Constitutionality of SPIIHI?
If, as seems logical, HHS intends to regulate common law pri-
vacy protections, it must find a rationale for doing this that does
not offend the Commerce Clause. In the "proposed need" sec-
tion noted briefly above HHS discusses a "philosophical or com-
mon-sense" perception of the need for privacy protection and,
in other sections throughout the preamble, it alludes to the
Commerce Clause as the means by which the HIPAA statute
and SPIIHI have the right to regulate privacy in the commercial
arena.30 6 This gives the impression that HHS intends to invade
the province of a state to protect the welfare of its citizens
through the back door of the Commerce Clause. However,
HHS fails to explicitly state and justify this intrusion thereby
threatening the precepts of federalism.
There is certainly ample precedent for federal protection of
citizen welfare using the Commerce Clause but these protec-
tions have generally required a clear showing of a impending
305. See HIPPA, Pub. L. No. 104-191 §262(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 2023 (1996) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1).
306. "Personal privacy issues are widely identified as a national concern by virtue
of the scope of interstate health commerce." Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59918, 60048 (1999) (proposed). "We
are proposing this approach because we believe that it focuses most directly on the
primary concern raised by HIPAA: the fact that growing use of computerization in
health care, including the rapid growth of electronic transfers of health information,
gives rise to a substantial concern about the confidentiality of the health care informa-
tion that is part of this growing electronic commerce." Id. at 50028.
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threat.3 °7 A significant flaw in HHS' argument is that there is no
clear demonstration of an imminent hazard. Instead of provid-
ing hard statistical data about real damages caused by the mis-
use of IIHI, HHS has focused on anecdotal reports and surveys
to show that fear of privacy violation is a major concern. In do-
ing so, it has failed to show that injury from privacy invasion is
an actual, manifest threat.30 8
HHS' failure to provide objective data about actual rather
than potential individual damage as a basis for the remarkably
broad scope of SPIIHI and its failure to specifically define how
it is using the Commerce Clause to reach regulation of IIHI may
prove a constitutional barrier to enforcement. Originally, when
wielding the Commerce Clause the federal government was re-
quired to demonstrate a direct connection to and impact upon
interstate commerce to justify impinging upon state jurisdic-
tion.30 9  However, since the late 1930s and early 1940s, the
United States Supreme Court has been liberal in holding that
the Commerce Clause may serve as the basis for the federal gov-
ernment to invade the police powers reserved to the states.310
Most recently, though, in United States v. Lopez,311 the Court
considered the extent of interstate involvement in determining
307. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (hold-
ing the Commerce Clause is sufficient, itself, to give Congress the power to regulate
private hotels since each house of Congress is replete with findings that black citizens
found it difficult to travel because of a lack of accommodations available to them,
thus interfering with interstate travel and commerce).
308. "Clearly, the growing problem of protecting privacy is widely understood and
a major public concern. Over 80 percent of persons surveyed in 1999 agreed with the
statement that they had 'lost all control over their personal information.' A Wall
Street Journal/NBC poll on September 16, 1999 asked Americans what concerned
them most in the coming century. 'Loss of personal privacy' topped the list, as the
first or second concern of 29 percent of respondents. Other issues such as terrorism,
world war, and global warming had scores of 23 percent or less. The regulation is a
major step toward addressing this public concern." See Standards for Privacy of Indi-
vidually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. at 60010. See also infra Parts
III-IV.
309. See NOWAK AND ROTUNDA, supra note 36, §§ 4.1-4.7.
310. See e.g. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In that case, an Ohio farmer
raised wheat on 23 acres of land. He consumed most of the wheat on his farm, either
by feeding it to livestock, making flour for personal use, or using it to produce seeds
for future crops. The Secretary of Agriculture assessed a penalty against the farmer
for exceeding his allotment for planting under a federal statute regulating wheat pro-
duction. The Supreme Court upheld the assessment, holding that the Congress's limi-
tation of the farmer's wheat production was a valid exercise of its authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce. Unless Wickard is read narrowly,
very little that occurs in this country can be viewed as not having some involvement
with interstate commerce.
311. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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whether oversight of an activity is within the bounds of Con-
gress's authority. In Lopez, the Supreme Court, for the first
time in sixty years,312 struck down an act of Congress, the Gun-
Free School Zones Act,313 on the basis that the act exceeded
congressional commerce clause authority. The Court held that
it was inappropriate to make an excessively elastic application of
the Commerce Clause.314 It stated that for an economic activity
to come within Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause the activity must "substantially affect" interstate com-
merce.315 Since Lopez, at least eleven Federal courts in four
separate circuits have similarly limited Commerce Clause au-
thority.31 6 If the United States Supreme Court is unwilling to
allow Congress to invade the state's rights to decide how best to
protect children from guns on school yards, is it likely to find the
protection of potentially embarrassing information a more com-
pelling need?
Thus, to summarize the multiple constitutional flaws in SPI-
IHI, Congress, when it drafted HIPAA, failed to provide ade-
quate direction in delegating to HHS the legislative authority to
entirely revise the medical industry's handling of medical
records in the name of privacy protection. HHS then over-
stepped any authority HIPAA arguably conferred in drafting
the regulations so broadly. Lastly, HHS offended federalism by
failing both to adequately define the privacy interest it intended
to protect and to provide objective data about the actual threat
it has a national interest in protecting.31 7 These failures makes it
312. See Edmond Seferi, FAA and Arbitration Clauses-How Far Can It Reach?
The Effect of Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 607, 617
(1997).
313. See The Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1988) (mak-
ing it a federal crime "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has
moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone").
314. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
315. Id.
316. See Westlaw, Key Cite United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
317. In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist divided previous Commerce Clause cases
into three categories of permissible regulation, any of which could arguably reach the
regulation of IIHI. These categories include: instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce (laws regulating safety of vehicles used in interstate commerce - the computer
is the vehicle by which IIHI is moved across state lines); channels of interstate com-
merce (laws freeing channels of commerce from discrimination, immoral activities, or
injurious uses - misuse of information is potentially injurious); and activities having a
substantial relation to commerce (regulation of healthcare information may have a
substantial effect on the ability of companies to do business in a cost effective way).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. To be on safe Constitutional grounds, HHS should
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unlikely that SPIIHI could withstand constitutional scrutiny by
the current Supreme Court because there is no well defined fed-
eral interest to balance against the intrusion into state affairs.
B. Costs: Is SPIIHI a Cost Effective Way to Spend
America's Health Care Dollars?
Of the added burdens placed on patients, providers and the
healthcare system in general, the financial strain of implement-
ing SPIIHI is clearly the most significant. HHS admitted that
the cost for implementation will be passed on to the con-
sumer.318 Interestingly, though, for a revolutionary program
that goes beyond any privacy protection currently in place in
this country, there is little substantive justification for the ex-
penditures and no exhaustive cost estimate.319 In fact, HHS' ef-
forts have been categorized by some critics as "ephemeral and
subjective. ' '320
Nevertheless, HHS did estimate that the total cost of SPIIHI
would be $3.8 Billion for five years, an estimate that is undoubt-
edly significantly low due to the unsophisticated model used to
predict cost and the fact that when expenses were difficult to
predict, HHS simply omitted them.321 Most of the health care
industry has been waiting for the regulations to be finalized
before investing significant resources in accurate cost estimation
models to counter HHS' assertions.322 However, after a thor-
ough reading of SPIIHI, the American Medical Association
(AMA), American Hospital Association (AHA) and American
College of Surgeons (ACS) all agree that HHS has substantially
underestimated the cost of its regulation.323 Blue Cross was suf-
have developed clear, concise arguments addressing HIPAA's constitutional (and
consequently HHS' and SPIIHI's derivative authority) to regulate IIHI.
318. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. 59918, 60016 (1999).
319. See Brittin, et al., supra note 76, at 1956-57; see also infra Parts II and III.
320. See Rick Pollack, Executive Vice President, American Hospital Association,
Letter to Donna E. Shalala commenting on the Proposed Standards for Individually
Identifiable Health Information dated Feb. 17, 2000 at Broad Issues § I, available at
<http://www.aha.org/ar/letters.asp? %6cookupLetterlD=198> (visited Feb. 21, 2000).
321. See supra Part IV(D)(3)(b-g).
322. Telephone interview with John Supplitt, Senior Policy Analyst at the Ameri-
can Hospital Association, in Chicago, IL 2/17/00.
323. See Pollack, supra note 320 (stating that the AHA believes HHS has seri-
ously underestimated the costs of implementation); see also Thomas R. Russell, Exec-
utive Director, American College of Surgeons, Letter to Margaret A. Hamburg dated
Feb. 15, 2000, http://www.facs.org/about-college/acsdept/socio-dept/acscomments/
medrecconf.html (visited Feb. 21, 2000) (stating the College is skeptical of the cost
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ficiently concerned about these costs that, in advance of the final
regulations, it independently commissioned the Nolan Report
which concluded that SPIIHI would cost $43 billion over five
years, an order of magnitude higher than HHS' estimate.324 Le-
gal analysts have simply said, "the plan proposed will be burden-
some and more expensive to implement than anyone likely
contemplates. 325
Another method to estimate SPIIHI costs might be to ex-
amine the complexity of SPIIHI in relationship to a similar en-
deavor of known cost. For example, hospitals spent an
estimated $8.2 billion in two years on Y2K compliance.326 Sys-
tems analysts estimate that the complexity of hospital changes
required for SPIIHI may be two to three times as complex as
those required for Y2K.327 In addition to the reprogramming
requirements, SPIIHI requires rewriting contracts, training staff,
new policies and procedures, hiring consultants, notice require-
ments and many other costs. Examining SPIIHI through this
lens suggests that the true costs may be much closer to the $43
billion than $3.8 billion.328
Whatever the exact dollar figure, the unfortunate conclusion
regarding the price of SPIIHI is that HHS has presented a rule,
the true cost of which is completely unpredictable except to say
that it will be very expensive (at a minimum in excess of $10-20
billion dollars over five years and more likely $30-40 billion) and
that the expenditure will reduce the funds available to actually
deliver health care.
Further, HHS is promulgating this rule at a time when
America is in the midst of a financial health care crisis. The
delivery of health care already costs American citizens in excess
of one trillion dollars annually, or approximately 15% of the
estimates); E. Ratcliff Anderson Jr., Executive Vice President, American Medical As-
sociation, Letter to Margaret A. Hamburg dated Feb. 17, 2000 at 43, available at http:/
/www.amaassn.org/ama/basic/article/238-574-1.html> (visited Feb. 21, 2000) (stating
the burden estimates are very inaccurate).
324. See Robert E. Nolan Company, supra note 50.
325. Chew & Felsenthal, supra note 292 (quoting Alan S. Goldberg, an attorney
with the Boston Office of Goulston and Storrs).
326. See Pollack, supra note 320, at Broad Issues § III.
327. Personal interview with Ida Androwicz, R.N., Ph.D., acknowledged expert in
the field of hospital informatics 2/24/00 at Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois.
328. Three times $8.2 billion ($16.4-$24.6 billion) plus extra costs of $10-$15 bil-
lion would total between $26 and $39 billion.
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gross national product.329 Despite this enormous expenditure, a
significant segment of the population goes without adequate
medical care. In fact, based on a realistic cost estimate, the price
of SPIIHI's proposed privacy protections could pay to extend
health care to every child in America or pay for a Medicare pre-
scription drug benefit. 330 No law can, as SPIIHI attempts to do,
provide total protection against every individual who is intent
on misusing information. Thus, before enacting a privacy rule, it
is important to ask the questions, (1) is the defined level of pri-
vacy protection really necessary and (2) is it worth the cost of
decreased care to America's children and elderly?
For the past fifteen years state and federal governments have
focused major efforts on the tasks of decreasing the growth rate
of health care expenditures and finding ways to recover money
misspent through overuse of the medical system or outright
fraud and abuse. HIPAA was the federal response of that focus
and has as a clear goal to both recover misappropriated funds331
and to reduce expenditures through increasing efficiency.332
SPIIHI with its attendant expenditures is in direct conflict with
HIPAA's goals.333 Its approach to reach, without clear justifica-
tion and without adequate impact analysis, into hundreds of
thousands of health care entities in thousands of locations, most
of whom already have in place safeguards to protect confidenti-
ality of patient information, is not only of questionable constitu-
tional validity, it is also redundant and irresponsible. SPIIHI
does not provide a cost-effective way to spend a defined portion
of America's health care dollars on privacy protection.
329. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS TO CONGRESS 12 (1996) (predicting yearly expenditures for health care
will exceed 1.4 trillion dollars by the year 2000).
330. The estimated five-year budget for the Children's Health Insurance Program
is $22 Billion. The estimated cost for the Medicare prescription drug benefit is $37
Billion for five years. See Robert E. Nolan Company, supra note 50, at 3.
331. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, Title II.
332. Id. § 261.
333. The AHA expressed this concern eloquently saying "the prescriptive nature
of the proposed standards will require hospitals to rewrite policies, retrain staff, rene-
gotiate contracts, and put in place comprehensive systems to track all uses and disclo-
sures of information. Such changes are costly and conflict with the cost reduction
goals of HIPAA." Pollack, supra note 320.
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C. Individual Rights: Who Does SPIIHI Really Protect and
Is This Protection Needed?
SPIIHI is intended to protect patients from the unconsented
use of their private health care data. HHS accomplishes this
goal by creating four new explicit and one new implicit "rights."
However, it limits its protection to "covered entities," specifi-
cally health care providers, health care plans and health care
clearing houses and generally omits protection from privacy in-
vasion by the federal government.
The four explicit new rights SPIIHI creates for patients are:
(1) the right to written notice of information practices; (2) the
right to an accounting of how an individual's IIHI has been dis-
closed; (3) the right of an individual to obtain access to her own
IIHI; and (4) the right to request amendment and correction of
PHI.334 Of these four rights, the first two are probably unneces-
sary and the last two can likely be created at a much lower cost.
The right to written notice of information procedures is a sim-
ply a waste of money in relation to any substantive benefit con-
veyed. In regard to notice, HHS makes note of its intent to
"create a system where open and accurate communication be-
tween [covered] entities and individuals would become neces-
sary and routine" by holding entities liable for the information
practices they publish under the notice requirements of §164.512
which include both posting of a notice and delivery of a notice
to the patient.335 This statement exposes the presupposition that
open and accurate communication does not exist between cov-
ered entities and patients. While this may be true for some enti-
ties such as insurance companies, it is unlikely true in physician
offices.
Further, while notice requirements may be a reasonable way
to shift the burden of ensuring that citizens are informed of their
rights from a government agency to private industry, it is diffi-
cult for this author to understand how such a requirement will
create new channels of open and accurate communication be-
tween physician and patient. Thus, the notice requirement is
simply too broad to be cost effective.
Likewise, the right to individual accounting of how informa-
tion has been disclosed by every covered entity is much more
334. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64
Fed. Reg. 59918, 59976-59988, 60059-60062 (1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
§§ 164.512, 164.514, 164.515, 164.516) (proposed).
335. Id. at 59951.
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expensive than any conceivable benefit. In keeping with the
theme that HHS should inform Congress that it cannot craft a
reasonable rule given its delegated powers, these notice and ac-
counting requirements should be abandoned in favor of a state-
ment in the definitive legislation that Congress intends to
protect individuals from misuse of IIHI as defined by the legisla-
tion and the requirement that all entities amassing IIHI on a
significant scale keep track of such disclosures.
The rights to access and correct misinformation in health
records are more substantive but for the most part do not re-
quire federal intervention. Most states already provide personal
access to individual medical records from providers. If states
find that their citizens need to be able to amend or correct
records at a local level (hospital, physician or state databases),
state legislatures can find a way to accomplish this. Federal law
should be concerned with requiring the entities it licenses to
gather and store large data sets of IIHI to allow inspection and
review of that information. This could be accomplished inex-
pensively by requiring the entity to send a data report to a re-
questing individual for a reasonable fee, such as is currently
required of credit bureaus. Similarly, any disputed information
could be subject to an administrative review process allowing
either correction of misinformation, a limited accompanying ex-
planatory statement by the individual, or both.
In addition to the explicit rights, SPIIHI creates at least one
implicit right. It creates the explicit duty to mitigate harm from
inappropriate disclosure of PHI.336 This duty gives rise to the
implicit patient right to recover damages when that duty is
breached. As written, however, SPIIHI contains no provision
for individual legal action. If a licensed entity damages an indi-
vidual, the individual should have either administrative or judi-
cial recourse to recover those damages.
The issue of what entities SPIIHI protects the patient from is
also an interesting one. SPIIHI only protects patients against
privacy violations by a limited group of "covered entities." Con-
spicuously missing from this group of entities is the government
itself, except in very narrow circumstances such as when it pro-
vides care. In light of the fact that the vast majority of federal
privacy cases have been against the government, the rule again
seems markedly misdirected at entities which already ade-
quately protect patient data.
336. See id. at 60062 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.518 (f)).
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D. Other Burdens Imposed by SPIIHI
The previous section points out the three major problems with
SPIIHI: its inherent unconstitutionality, high cost, and the fact
that it is an inefficient guardian of the very rights it invents and
ostensibly protects. There are numerous other unreasonable,
detrimental and expensive burdens imposed by SPIIHI. This
section will briefly enumerate some of the more important of
those encumbrances.
1. Administrative Burdens related to Business Partners
In the struggle to extend control beyond entities specifically
covered by HIPAA legislation, SPIIHI creates a major burden
for covered entities by holding them liable for violations perpe-
trated by their business associates including billing firms, consul-
tants, and attorneys.337 In creating this liability, the Secretary
goes so far as to require all covered entities to enter a contrac-
tual agreement with each business partner and offers a detailed
list of mandates that must be set forth in those contracts. This is
basically another attempt to expand the scope of the HHS' au-
thority outside of HIPAA constraints.
The effect of this provision is to impose on business associates
adherence to all of the provisions of SPIIHI, as well as compli-
ance with the privacy policies and practices of the covered enti-
ties themselves. Business partners, in turn, would be required to
impose similar contractual provisions upon any of their associ-
ates or sub-contractors to whom they disclose protected infor-
mation. All of these entities would be expected to participate in
compliance audits by HHS. Finally, the proposal states that ma-
terial breaches by business partners of their obligations under
the contract would be considered noncompliance on the part of
the covered entities, if the covered entities knew or reasonably
should have known of such breach and failed to take reasonable
steps to cure the breaches or terminate the contracts.
These provisions place enormous administrative and legal
burdens on covered entities and their business partners. For
business partners that perform services for multiple entities, the
proposed rule means they must implement multiple sets of in-
formation policies and procedures. For physicians and other
covered entities, the proposed language means that they would
be required to know the policies and procedures of the entire
337. See id. at 59947-59950.
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universe of businesses with which they contract, or be held lia-
ble. This is a totally unrealistic and unworkable overstepping of
constitutional authority by HHS.
2. Preemption
In accordance with HIPAA mandates, SPIIHI cannot pre-
empt state laws that offer more protection, require parental no-
tification or that relate to a wide variety of state functions.338
HHS has put a positive spin on these restrictions saying that
SPIIHI will create a federal floor of privacy protection. In real-
ity however, these legislative restrictions prevent HHS from cre-
ating a nationally uniform rule that is equitably and cost
efficiently enforceable. Not only is SPIIHI flawed, expensive
and potentially unenforceable, it simply cannot do the job it is
intended to do because of the size and number of loopholes.
3. Research Information
One of the most important areas in which SPIIHI creates ad-
ditional burdens is the area of scientific research. While it is
clear that Institutional Review Boards (IRB) are necessary pro-
tections for the rights of patients, SPIIHI expands the criteria
that IRBs and other internal privacy committees must apply in
approving a research proposal and its use of protected informa-
tion. These additional requirements include: (1) the research
must be impracticable to conduct without the PHI; (2) the re-
search project is of sufficient importance to outweigh the intru-
sion into the privacy of the individual whose information would
be disclosed; (3) there is an adequate plan to protect the identi-
fiers from improper use and disclosure; and (4) there is a plan to
destroy the identifiers at the earliest opportunity consistent with
the conduct of the research. These requirements are imposed
with absolutely no data or evidence that they are directed at
remedying an existing problem and in the face of a well-estab-
lished common IRB rule already adopted by seventeen federal
agencies.339
Respected physician organizations have expressed concern
that HHS is acting prematurely in imposing these new criteria,
stressing that HHS has "not completed its planned review of the
338. See HIPAA § 262. For example, SPIIHI cannot preempt state laws relating
to reporting of disease or injury, child abuse, birth, death, public health surveillance,
regulatory reporting, state regulation of insurance and many others areas.
339. See Brittin et al., supra note 76, at 1955 n.52.
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Common [IRB] Rule nor has the Institute of Medicine spoken
to [the] issue. "340 These concerns highlight another major flaw
in SPIIHI - the fact that it was issued without sufficient atten-
tion to its ramification or adequate consultation with the profes-
sional groups affected by the rule.
4. Compliance and Enforcement
SPIIHI requires that all covered entities comply within
twenty-four to thirty-six months of the finalization of the rule
and, because it lacks a private right of action, allots the entire
enforcement burden to HHS. HHS has neither the staffing nor
the fiscal resources to enforce such a broad and complex rule
uniformly and equitably. The likely result will be haphazard,
random and inconsistent enforcement which will not achieve the
uniform minimal privacy protection HIPAA intended but will
instead ignite a firestorm of litigation, again diverting precious
health dollars into the legal and administrative stream of
commerce.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO ENACTING SPIIHI AS A FINAL RULE:
WHAT SHOULD HHS Do WITH SPIIHI
The two glaring conceptual flaws in SP11H13 41 and the many
major and minor blemishes in its drafting342 raise the question of
what should be done with HHS' massive document? If SPIIHI
is allowed to take effect as written, the flurry of legal challenges
trying to iron out the problems in a piecemeal fashion will likely
result in the diversion of more precious health care dollars into
the judicial system. On the other hand, if SPIIHI is simply
scrapped, the hard work of Mr. Fanning and countless others
would be wasted.
There are alternatives to scrapping SPIIHI or enacting it as
written. The first is to simply take into account all the com-
ments generated by the proposed rule and try to revise the final
rule in light of those comments. A second would be to return to
the legislature and ask for proper guidance and authority to
340. See e.g., Russell, supra note 323.
341. The fact that HHS fails to define its ultimate goal adequately and coherently
and the fact that its proposed protections are not focused on the existing problem.
See supra Parts I and II.
342. The potential lack of constitutionality, the lack of cost concerns, the place-
ment of a privacy right higher than a right to health care and other major burdens.
See supra Part V.
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write a meaningful rule. A third would be to seek substantive
help from the industries involved to accomplish the stated goals.
In its commentary on SPIIHI, the American Hospital Associ-
ation urged HHS to more carefully consider costs and other bur-
dens it imposes and rewrite it, limiting its scope to the statutorily
defined transactions before finalizing this regulation. 343 Simi-
larly, the American College of Surgeons and American Medical
Association also advised rewriting SPIIHI.344 With proper def-
erence to these three organizations,345 merely rewriting a flawed
document seems an exercise in futility. More time and money
should not be wasted on this effort.
Alternatively, the proposed rule could serve as a starting
point to generate legislative discussion to overcome the concep-
tual flaws and constitutional problems in the existing document.
A rewrite of SPIIHI in light of the comments received could
serve as the basis for a bill to properly delegate the constitu-
tional authority necessary for HHS to construct meaningful
rules. SPIIHI, in a modified form, could be sponsored by a bi-
partisan group of elected Senators and Representatives and in-
troduced into the legislative arena as a bill to be debated,
compromised and molded into a statement of discernable stan-
dards which can then be handed back to HHS to rewrite appro-
priate regulations.
The best solution would be for HHS to simply inform Con-
gress that it cannot, given the legislative guidance and mandates
provided, produce a set of constitutional rules that will accom-
plish meaningful protection of IIHI. There is no shame in ad-
mitting that the tools provided are inadequate for the job at
hand. Then, HHS should take its medical advisory role to Con-
gress seriously by first defining very carefully what aspects of
medical record privacy should be protected on a federal level
and what should be left to the states. Smaller scale issues of
what occurs in a physician's office or an individual hospital
should be left to state legislatures and courts to protect. They
are already doing this, and for the most part, successfully. The
bigger issue of large multi-state information warehouses amas-
sing large amounts of medical data with high abuse potential
343. See Pollack, supra note 320, at Broad Issues § III.
344. See Russell, supra note 323; see also Anderson Jr., supra note 323, at 47.
345. The author is an individual member of two of the three organizations (the
AMA and the ACS) and works for an organization which belongs to the AHA.
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should be dealt with at a federal level in a more deliberate
fashion.
HHS should make recommendations about how to protect
IIHI only after defining and prioritizing specific threats to its
confidentiality. It should then address the cost of neutralizing
each threat individually so that Congress can make the proper
cost/benefit and political interest balance analyses. The MIB,
credit bureaus and other large data users are only collecting in-
formation because they find it financially beneficial. If carefully
defined legitimate uses are permitted to continue but abuses are
made financially detrimental, the misuse of IIHI will largely
cease and the problem to shrink to a more manageable size.
Throughout his lifetime, Justice Brandeis was a key player in
defining the right to privacy so perhaps it would be instructive to
return to his principles to develop a regulatory scheme to pro-
tect it. Brandeis clearly believed that the best way to regulate
information in the securities field was to make it available for
inspection saying: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best
of disinfectants; electric light is the most efficient policeman. "346
Without exposing actual IIHI to unnecessary inspection, Bran-
deis' principle may be applied to the practices of information
collection and use. Instead of trying to micromanage IIHI, HHS
should recommend that Congress simply make it illegal to amass
data in relative secrecy such as is currently done by the MIB and
credit bureaus.
The privilege of collecting large amounts of IIHI should re-
quire federal licensure and Congress should appropriate suffi-
cient funds to allow HHS to be a watchdog over licensed
companies to ensure the data is secure from misuse. Congress
should further define the legitimate purposes for which such
data can be used and institute sufficient penalties, civil and crim-
inal, to make the misuse of IIHI financially non-viable. This
plan, while requiring more creative thought and initial expendi-
ture to define the problems, would be much more likely to be
cost effective in the long run.
An alternative to the dilemma of what to do with SPIIHI is to
call upon the various industries to be regulated to help write
workable legislation and rules. This approach has been success-
346. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n,
432 F. Supp. 1190, 1198 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 1977) (quoting Justice Brandeis from BRAN-
DEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1932).
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ful in other health care legislative endeavors. For example,
when Medicare was charged with the task of developing stan-
dardized Medigap policies it turned to the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) for help.347 NAIC success-
fully developed ten options, defined by the benefit packages
each offers, and submitted them to HHS which adopted the
plans by reference.348 Further, the NAIC, the American Medi-
cal Association, the American Hospital Association, the Ameri-
can College of Surgeons and others have already expressed an
interest in assisting HHS in the task of developing privacy
protections.349
In the case of SPIIHI, the process would be more complex
and time consuming than that undertaken in Medigap. Medigap
only covered one major type of organization-insurers-while
SPIIHI intends to cover hundreds of types of organizations. To
effectively obtain help with workable rules, HHS would need to
appoint and convene at least five committees: (1) health care
providers; (2) health care plans; (3) health care clearing houses;
(4) governmental entities; and (5) consumers. Many of these
committees would need multiple subcommittees to deal with the
variations in businesses contained in each general grouping. For
example, providers would need committees to look at the
problems with hospitals, physicians, long term care facilities, etc.
There are two problems with this approach: cost and time.
The cost could probably be absorbed to a large extent by the
various groups who would likely perceive a chance to influence
the process of developing cost effective rules for privacy protec-
tion as a good business investment. HHS would thus only have
to support the consumer and government committees. Time is a
significant hurdle in that a project of this size would likely take a
minimum of two to three years to complete. However, the like-
lihood that a workable, cost effective and reasonable solution
347. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (p) (1999).
348. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss (p) (1999) (giving the NAIC authority to develop the
standardized plans and requiring that happen by 1991); see also Medicare Program;
HHS' Recognition of NAIC Model Standards for Regulation of Medigap Policies, 57
Fed. Reg. 37980 (1992) (where HHS actually adopts the NAIC model policies) and
Medicare Program; Recognition of NAIC Model Standards for Regulation of Medi-
care Supplemental Insurance, 63 Fed. Reg. 67078 (1998) (updating the NAIC model
policies to comply with the Balanced Budget Act of 1997).
349. See Meg Fletcher, NAIC Seeks Privacy Input, Bus. INs. March 27, 2000 at 1;
see also Russell, supra note 323; Anderson Jr., supra note 323; Pollack, supra note 320,
at Broad Issues § III.
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would come out of the process offsets any negative implications
of the time investment.
To most effectively implement this plan, the consumer com-
mittee should be convened first to establish and rank in order of
importance what privacy violations should be regulated. It
should also establish what percentage of the total dollars availa-
ble for medical care should be expended to ensure that privacy.
This list and cost determination should then be turned over to
the four other committees and their subcommittees to develop
cost effective procedures to implement necessary controls. HHS
should oversee the entire process and then help Congress draft
appropriate enabling legislation to allow HHS the proper consti-
tutional authority to enact the proposed rules. In terms of en-
forcement, HHS should retain the ability to police the system
but should also provide a private right of action to allow citizens
to recover personal damages.
CONCLUSION
In summary, HHS, in response to the mandates of section 264
of HIPAA, has drafted a proposed rule on privacy protection
that is flawed and totally unworkable. The rule fails to ade-
quately protect the intended privacy interests at an exorbitant
cost in an unconstitutional fashion. It has major defects in its
conception in that it fails to adequately define the privacy it in-
tends to protect or clarify the threat to medical information con-
fidentiality. The rule then proposes to spend an incalculable but
enormous sum of money on that protection, exceeding its dele-
gated authority and offending concepts of federalism without
proper justification. Lastly the rule imposes expensive burdens
in many ancillary areas such as research and contracting without
any regard for the fact that these burdens will reduce the
amount of medical care delivered to groups in desperate need of
care.
The last paragraph may sound like a damning criticism of
HHS but it is not intended to be read in that light. HHS was
handed an unconstitutional mandate and made a Herculean ef-
fort to comply with that mandate. However, the task is simply
not possible with the tools provided by Congress. At this time,
the final rule should be suspended until HHS adequately ad-
dresses the concerns of the many physicians, providers and in-
surers that have critically analyzed this rule. It should refuse to
act in an unconstitutional manner and demand adequate gui-
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dance from Congress. In the meantime, HHS should consider
bringing industry, government and patients together to develop
a creative and cost effective proposal that will afford protections
to consumers and give them a right to hold violators responsible
for damages caused by misuse of private medical information
while not overzealously diverting their health care dollars into
administrative and legal channels.
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